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INTRODUCTION
During the period of reaction in England after the Napoleonic
wars, a new generation of reformers developed, who abjured the belief
in natural rights already discredited by the Jacobin excesses.1

These

individuals sought a personality arcund whom they could center their
program.

Jeremy Bentham, a seemingly apolitical man, gradually became

the personification of the new methodology.

Crane Brinton has

written, "scarcely has an English thinker left a more definite trice
upon English legislation than Jeremy Bentham."2

So involved are the

implications of the system and the man who introduced the
that interest is produced by the study itself.

new science"

Largely under his

name and doctrine, the English middle class moved forward to capture
new political power without a revolution.
Bentham has been endlessly misinterpreted but usually for
intellioible reascns.

His critics use neither the neutral terms of

the logician nor the politician's sardonic language but the fictions
of the poet.

From that day in June 1818 when Lord Brougham arose in

the House of Commons and scorned him as "having dealt more with books

3

than with men,"

down to our present era where the Benthamite tradition

1 J.

Bronowski and Bruce Mazlish, The Western Intellectual
Tradition (New York, 1960), 430.
2
Crane Brinton, En_glish Political Thought in the Nineteenth
Century (London, 1933), 14.
3
John Bowing (ed.), The Works of JereTy_ Bentham (New York,
1962; originally published in Idiii176-1-I,71-641T, VIT, 199.

1
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is denounced as "the worm which has been gnawing at the insides of
"4
modern civilization and is responsible for its present moral decay,
Jeremy Bentham and his theories have been notorious

He has been

attacked with every verbal weapon from sarcasm to kindly correction
and from wit to plodding exergeses.

Most critics indicate an admiration

of him in numerous respects but all are specific in their caustic
reviews.

To Southey, Bentham was a "meta-physico-critico-politico-

patriotico-phoalo-philospher."5

Karl Marx called him the insipid,

pedantic, leather-tongued oracle of the commonplace bourgeois
;ntelligence of the nineteenth century and went on to say that
Bentham
. , . assumes the modern petty bourgeois and above
all the modern English petty bourgeois, to be the
normal man. Whatever seems useful to this queer
sort of normal man and to his world, is regarded
as useful in and by itself. By this yardstick,
Bentham proceeds to measure everything past,
present and to come. . . . Had I the pluck of
my friend, Heinrick Heine, I should call
Mr. Jeremy,a genius in the way of bourgeois
stupidity.°
James Mackintosh described the followers of Bentham in this
way:
The disciples of Mr. Bentham are more like the
hearers of an Athenian philosopher than the pupils
of a modern professor or the cool proselytes of a
modern writer. They are in oeneral men of competent
age, of superior understanding, who voluntarily
embrace the laborious study of useful and nobel
sciences; who derive their opinions not so much
4John Maynard Keynes, Two Memoirs (New York, 1949), 96.
'Brinton, En,ulish Political Thoilaht, 15.
6Karl Marx, Capital, trans. Roger C. Faraday (New York,
1951), LL, 671.

from the cold perusal of Bentham's writings as from
familiar converse with a master from whose lips these
opinions are recommended by simplicity, disinterestedness, originality and vivacity; aided rather than
Impeded by foibles not unamiable, enforced of late
by the growing authcrity of years and of fame and at
all times strengthee,'; by that undoubting reliance
on his own judgement which mightly increases the
ascendant of such a man over those who approach him.7
No matter the perspective through which Bentham is viewe or
d
analysed the resultant will probably be fallacious if
the cultural and
philosophical milieu in which he wrote is not understood
.

Bentham at

first spoke to British legislators, members of Parliament
and officers
of the law coupts who might have handed down his recommende
d reforms
from the top of the structure of power.
they do not dance . .

I make

"I pipe," Bentham said, "but

.dvances, but they do not follow."8

When they seemed deaf he turned to new areas mnre succeptabl
e to his
innovations.

Therefore to know the man one must know the sitz im

leben and all of its ramifications.
It is obvious that the rationalism of the eighteenth centu
ry
in England replaced the decaying theologies and substitute
d reeson for
traditional authority.

This is the same period that also witnessed

the inception in France of the philosophic concept of abstr
act
humanity, everywhere the same naturally with a superficia
l distinction
of circumstances, but differentiated in the main by bad laws,
artificial
inequalities and socia

injustiee.9

In France the method of deducing

conclusione from abstract principles concerning the
rights of man and
7James
Mackintosh, Dissertations (London, 1840), 12.
8Bowring, Works, II, 58.
- Sir Alfred Lyall, Studies in Literature and History (Lond
on,
1864), 210.

-
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the social compact gained predominance, until they were shaped by
Rousseau and others into the formal indictment of a corrupt society.
It was this impulse thus given to very real grievances and irritation
against privilege, that preciptated the French Revolution.

Among the

English, on the other hand, their public spirit, the connection of
large classes with national affairs and their habit of compromise,
had predisposed the leading minds towards cautious views in
philosophy and politics, at the end of the century their innate
distrust of abstract propositions as a basis for social reconstruction
received startling confirmation from the tremendous explosion in
France.

10
There was in the Anglican world a revolution just as radical

as that on the other side of the channel.

To the French political

insurgence corresponded the century of industrial revolution.

Leslie

Stephen indicates that it might be stated as a paradox that, whereas
in France the most demonstrative evils arose from the excessive power
of the central government, in England the most evident evils arose
11
from the feebleness of the central government.
The English aristocracy, in fact, were actually doing the
country's business, though they were doing it badly and paid themselves excessively for very indifferent administration.
oa.

Yet the

English nation acquiesed in the system because the middle classes
were growing rich and prosperous and the state interfered very little
1°Elie

Halevy, The Growth of Philosophic Radicalism, trans.
Mary Morris (New York, 1449)79.
11 Stephen, Utilitarians,

O.

NIF7,1%

5
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with their private affairs.12

The Upper Class offered to all the

motivation of continued recruitment, being open to all successful
men.13

This kind of governing body is naturally indifferent to

reforms, because it is affected little by administrative
imperfections or abuses.

Pauperism and ignorance may fester long

among the masses before wealthy and prosperous rulers discover
interests of their own class are imperilled.

that

of prisons does not concern or affect them personally.

The state
With life

and property secure they care little about an efficient police
force.

14
In England the Church, the Law and the army were all open

pr9fessions with no special fiscal rights or social limitations, or
so they claimed.

The attainment of these positions was available

for general competition.

Because everyone assumed they had an

opportunity of gaining these by interest or merit there was not
15
any formidable outcry against the system.
The prevailing dispositicn of the English mind was more
moderate in politics as well as in philosophy, less thoroughgoing
and subversive than in France.
there was a syr4

In philosophy, as in politics,

16
hic recoil from extremes.

During this era

1 2George Macaulay Trevelyan, British History in the
Nineteenth Century (London, 1930), 132.
13Ibid.,
193.
14John
Petrov Plamenatz, The English Utilitarians (Oxford,
1958), 5.
15Trevelyan, British History, 194.
16John Theodore Men, A History of European Thought in the.
Nineteenth Century (New York, 1904), IV, 208.

6

there had been a period of calcification resulting in a legal system
highly opposed to any type of change, in fact the slightest breath of
criticism was construed as a step to sedition.17
The English politician was somewhat suspicious of abstract
principles, but attempted to cover his acceptance of tradition and
rule of thumb with general phrases about liberty and toleration.
The philosopher equally accepted the traditional creed sufficiently
purified from cruder elements and sheltered his concepts by
speaking of intuitions and laws of thought.18
The loose morality of the time and the weakening of
religious faith, at any rate among the enlightened classes, were
universally admitted and deplored.

But this breakup of existing

moral standards was really only hidinn the birth of a new world.
A new era was beginning for western society.

Even with the

disruption of traditional morality there was a spread of
philanthropy, of a conscientious fellow-feeling for those classes
of society who suffered from neglect and misrule that fostered
the movement towards political and social reform.19

This was the

century of the Industrial Revolution, of the economists and the
great inventors.

In this atmosphere the technological innovations

intruded into the English way of life with no opportunity of
assimilation.
17Philip Anthony Brown, The French Revolution in England
(London, 1923), 109.
1 3Aerz
,

, European Thought, 211.

10
-Stephen, Utilitarians, 63.

7

The England of the Restoration passed into a nation of rapid
change.

The manufacturino industry had grown resulting in new

industrial towns.

The population roved from the southern seaport

towns to the new productive centers in the north 20

The flying

shuttle which had been invented by .ohn Kay, the use of revolving
rollers by Richard Arkwright and the invention by James Hargraves
of the spinning jenny.

These improvements, used first in the

manufacture of cotton, were gradually applied in all the textile
industry.21
The extensive introduction of labor saving machinery in
all industry at once disturbed the old industrial equilibrium.
Workmen saw their livelihood taken from them and turned their
fury upon the new inventions.
all vocations.

This state of flux carried into

it was upon the iron trade that James W

YS

great invention of the steam engine .,ad its riost direct influence.
•
41:

The production of England increased from 17.350 tons in 1740 to
170,000 in 1801.22
The development of new lines of industrial activty acted
directly upon the entire English social structure.

The volume of

trade steadily increased as did canal and road building (During
King George's III reign 3,000 miles of canals were constructed).23
This increase called for fierce competition.
20G.
21

Me wise, the cunning

Trevelyan, Histony of England (London, 1926), 605.

A1fred H. Sweet, History of England (Boston, 1931), 703.
22
W. E. Lunt, History of Encili)nd (London, 1938), 578.
23
Benjamin Terry, History of Eng)and (New York, 1901), 914.
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and thrifty survived while the stupid, the lazy and the thriftless
were driven to the wall.

The successful operators began to combine

forces; the master workman, working in his own cottage, assisted by
one or two journeymen and an apprentice lad or two, gave way to the
wealthy manufacturer who built a huge factory and gathered into it
a small army of men, women and children.

These workmen toiled long

hours feeding his machines while he sat in his office dividing his
attention between his balance sheet and the market.

The picture is

not an attractive one, the new "captain of industry" was often hard,
illiterate, without heart or culture.

He looked upon his ww-kmen as

he looked upon his machines, to be easily worn out and to be as
24
easily replaced.
The workmen in this period were poor and ignorant.
surroundings were brutalizing.

They were without schools and churches.

Their working days were spent in dreary hours of toi
srrelling, dingy factories.

All their

in dark, ill

Their nights were no better, being spent

in shabby, ill kept and unhealthy brick cottages, their Sundays in
the ooblic house.25
For this ,,Tary multitude the state did nothing, save to
recruit thei[. ranks from the children of the poor-houses, who were
regularly transported to the slavery of the factory as soon as they
were able to relieve the public of their keep.
4 ,

The state had no

thought of protecting the factory hands from the greed of the master.
24

Trevelyan, England, 670.

25
F. George Marcham, History of England (New York, 1937),
710.

9

The new towns which sprang up were not represented in parliament,
labor was not organized.

The toiling multitude had no means known

to the constitution by which they could command the attention of the
men who made the laws and quarreled over the patronage of the
government.

These workmen offered a ready field for the agitator.

The Industrial Revolution piled up a backlog of social
problems that could not be solved by the political ideas and
machinery which had served a decentralized agrarian society.

The

names of Locke and Newton were proverbiably associated with the
new atmosphere of change.

The Newtonian method, with a propensity

toward determining the smallest possible number of general simple
laws which, once discovered, will enable all the details of
phenomena to be explained by the deductive, was employed.

Locke

represented that preoccupation with social affairs, sciences of
the mind and society.
In this moral Newtonianism the principle of utility
replaeed the naturalistic view of universal attraction.

Into this

fluxuating scene utilitarianism care the political and philosee! cal
panacea.

.4--

CHAPTER I
Pre-Benthamite Origin of the
Utilitarian Theory
Rarely has a way of thi
nking captured the imagination
of
generations of me, so com
pletely as did the Utilitarian
philosophy.
It was a creed propagate
d by a group of remarkable
men, who
advocated some of the
prominent theories and doctri
nes generated by
the rationalism of the
preceeding century and endeav
ored to make
them the basis and framework
of a system for improving
the condition
of the English people)
Its chief aspiration was to
remove abuses
and to devise remedies for
the evils of an unwieldy and
complicated
administrative machine,
clogged by stupidity and sel
fishness.2
The Utilitarians, proper
ly so called, flourished in Eng
land
for a period of the eig
hteenth to the middle of the
nineteenth
century. There were also
Utilitarians in France and oth
er parts of
Europe but the doctrine
is essentially English. In
its many varieties
it constitutes the most
significant contribution made
by the English
to philosophical, moral
and political theory during
this period.3 It
is a philosophy of emanci
pation, very different in its
inspiration

1 Lya

ll, Literature and Histor
y, 219.

2Jer
emy Bentham, A Fragment
on Government (Oxford, 194
originally published ano
8;
nymously London717AT,-14
.
3
Ernest Albee, A History
of English Utilitarianism (Londo
1902), 40.
n,
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and principles but related in many of its applications to the
sentimental philosophy of Pousseau.4
There had been, on the one hand the development of the
physical sciences, the discovery of Newton's principle of
association which made it possible to found on a single law
a complete science of nature.

The hope that ensued was the

desire to discover an analogous principle capable of serving
for the establishment of a synthetic science of the phenomena
of moral and social life.

As previously listed the crisis in

society, which was itself due in part to the development of
science and to the progress of its practical applications called
5
for transformation of the judical, economic and political regimes.
This gave rise to schemes for reform and to reformers without
number.

The most mundane need was a single principle capable of

uniting into a single theoretic whole many of these scattered
concepts.

These are the general causes of the formation of the

There are certain aspects of Utilitarianism common to
each of the contributors.

The following is a succinct definition

of the doctrine asserted or assumed by its adherents: (1) Pleasure
is alone good or desirable for its own sake; or else men call only
those things good that are pleasant or a means to what is pleasant.
(2) The equal pleas'ires of any two or more men are equally good.
(3) No action is right unless it appears to the agent to be the
A

'Leslie Paul, The English Philosophers (London, 1952), 189.

5F. H.
Underhill, "Fentham and Benthamism," Queens Qyarterly,
vol. 39 (November, 1932), 659.

1?

action most likely, under the circumstances, to produce the greatest
happiness, or else men do not call any action right unless it is
one of a type that usually produces the greatest happiness possible
under the circumstances. (4) Men's obligations to the government of
the country in which they live and that government's duties to them,
have nothing to do with the way in which the government first
acquired power or maintains it, except to the extent to which these
origins and methods affect its ability to carry out their duties.6
Though these four propositions present the essence of
Utilitarianism, this does not mean that Otiitarians do not often
make statements

nconsistent with them.

These, in the sum of their

usual meanings, embrace most of the beliefs to which the Utilitarians
attach the greatest importance.
In the development of Utilitarian theory, the philosophical
fathers borrowed more than they originated.

It is evident they

followed a long and distinguished line of thinkers to whom they
owed great debts.

Bentham in his quest for productivity consistently

used and abused his sources.
considerable exposition.

It is his legacy ehich needs

The-intricate fabric of his philosophical

doctrine often leads the reader or follower to accept the proposition
as

3

new dogma; but careful research indicates that others have

for7Julated similar doctrines in earlier works such as books, pamphlets
and oral statements.

This latitudinarian listing chronologically

views the predecessors of Pentham without relating specific areas
6
For a longer and more detailed resume consult Plamenatz,
The English Utilitarians, 14.

13

of contributions.

A later textual study makes evident the direct

relationOlip between originator and grammatist.
Allusions to the principle of utility are found among preSocr. tics, in the eudaemonistic ethics of Democritus even in the
Indian philosophy in the period 500 B.C., and in every phase of
7
human history.
This survey is not to recall each of these
contributions but to list those influences preparatory to the
work later accomplished by Bentham and that which was claimed
by him.
The first writer in English history who fully achieved
the exact utilitarian formula of the greatest happiness principle
was Francis Hutcheson.

In his Inquiry. into the Original of our

Ideas of Beauty and Virtue, 1725, he explicitly states, "That
action is best, which procures the greatest happiness for the
greatest numbers and that worst, which, in like manner, occasions
8
misery."
Hutcheson is often overlooked for his contributions
!
because he is basically a writer in the field of ethics.
In 1730 there appeared at the head of a new edition of a
philosophical work, A Dissertation Concerning the Principle and
Criterion of Virtue and the Origin of the Passions, whose author,
John Gay, can be considered the true founder of the new philosophy.
It is true that there is still a theological element in Gay's
7

William L. Davidson, Political Thought in Ennland; The
Utilitarians from Bentham to
!
,T11- TI- don, 19163, viii.
PJrancis Hutcheson, An Inquiry into the Orininal_ of our
Ideas of Beauty and Virtue found in David Baumgardt, Bentham
and the Ethics of Tod' (New York, 1960), 47.

14

philosophy, for he appeals in his moral theory to the idea of everlasting rewards and penalties.
follows:

His philosophy can be summed up as

all men seek pleasure and avoid pain; to seek pleasure is

at once the necessary and the normal law of all human action.
Although it may easily be admitted that all men agree on the end to
be sought, it is clear that they cease to agree with regard to the
means through which they attain this necessary end.

This is because

everyone does not connect happiness with the same ideas or the
associations of ideas vary from individual to individual.

The basis

then of his view of the Utilitarian philosophy is found in the
psychology of association.

This in some respects explains his

phrase "the Happiness of Mankind may be said to be the Criterion
9
of Virtue."
In the realm of moral theory two concepts had prevailed
among European Philosophers.

The one made the supreme object of

human endeavor the full and harmonious development of all the powers
4

of the individual; while the other declares that virtue consists in
behavior according to rules that man can discover by the use of his
reason.ltf These two kinds of theories can be combined in many ways
and they can also be related to many different conceptions of the
universe.

It can, for instance, be said that a man will realize

himself, will become his best if he behaves according to the laws
9John
Gay, Preliminary Dissertation Concerning the Fundamental
Principle of Virtue or Morality, prefixed to Edmund Law's translation
of archbishop William King, An Essay on the Crig_in of Evil (London,
1758), XXIV.
10Mary Peter Mack, Jeremy Bentham:
(New York, 1963), 91.

An Odessa of Ideas

lb

of nature revealed to him by his reason.

It can be said, as it was

by men like Plato and Aristotle, that man will attain his develo
pment
only in the perfectly constituted state. 11 Hobbes found no
room in
his philosophy for any essential part of either of the
two most
important European moral philosophies.
from the European tradition.

It is here he stepped aside

He began to express questions in a

different way and gave different answers.
in the system of Thomas Hobbes, no man could be better or
worse than he was before; he could only be more or less succes
sful
in acquiring felicity.12 Nor are there any rules which all
men, who
have the use of their reason, discover to be binding upon themse
lves
merely because they are rational beings.

The laws of morality, in

the opinion of Hobbes have no such validity.

They are merely rules

that men, since they wish to be happy, would do well
to obey,
provided that other men do likewise.
" The state is no more than
a contrivance to insure that all men do obey these rules, so that
it may be to the interest of each of them to do so.

For a man who

obeys them, while others do not, is no better than a fool.14
It is in the sphere of: political philosophy that Thomas Hobbes
had the rDst direct and obvious influence on the Utilitarians.

They,

like Hobbes regarded the state as a means of reconciling men's selfis
h
11 Samual
1966), 86

Enoch Stumpf, Socrates to Sartre (New York,

12
!:a1evy, Philosophic Radicalism, 27.
13
Ibid., 28.
14Plamenatz, English Utilitarians, 39.

16

interests.

15

It exists, not to protect a man's right but to give them

more abundantly the happiness they always seek.

The Utilitarians

took little interest in the origin of the state, while Hobbes devotes
many pages to its description.

He is regarded as one of the great

exponents of the theory of the social contract.

His purpose is not

to explain why and what extent subjects are obliged to obey their
rulers but only to prove that it is in their interest to do so.

He,

like the Utilitarians after him, thought it the great function of
government to reconcile selfish interests, to make it worth every
7,
1S

while to obey laws giving security to all men.

The state,

aceording to him, is neither the promoter of the good life nor the
16
protector of rights; it is the conciliator of interests.

These

are evident fundamental political doctrines closely related to those
accepted by the Utilitarians.
There are some respects in which John Locke stood closer to
the doctrines of utility than Hobbes.

Like the Utilitarians Locke

P.sserted that there are no moral laws whose validity is immediately
recognized without regard to their consequences.

He believed that

the great variety of opinions -about morals held in different
societies, or in the same society at different times, are sufficient
evience that this assertion is true.

He points out that God, having,

by an inseparable connection, joined virtue and public happiness
together and made the practice thereof necessary to the preservation
156entham,
On Government, 11.
16
George S. Nesbitt, Benthamite Reviewing:
-4-- The First Twelve
Years
_
_ _ of the Westminister Review -Pew York-, 104), 91.

3
17

14I

.4

of society and visibly beneficial to all.

71,

It is no wonder that

everyone should not allow but recommend and magnify these rules to
others, from whose observance of them he is sure to reap advantage
17
to himself.
That is to say, God has mace it worth every man's
while to behave in v.ys that promote the public happiness and it is
this behavior that constitutes virtue.

1,4

It is this doctrine that

William Paley later borrowed from him in his concept of the

-4

Utilitarian God contained in The Principles of Morals.18
Mention must be made at this point that Locke does not, in
so many words, say that the public happiness is the measure of
right and wrong.

He suggests that it is God who must supply men

with motives for pursuing it; their object, in obeying God's laws,
being always to their own advantage and not the pubiL intent.
There is more egotistic hedonism than Utilitarian concept in Locke's
moral theory than his political philosophy.

The social contract is

his central theme and what he describes is a true covenant imposin
g
real obligations on the parties to it.

He accepts a traditional

doctrine and elaborates it so that it can serve as the theoritical
justification of limited monarchy and parliamentary supremacy.19
The idea around which his entire political philosophy turns is that
every legitimate government is the protector of rights uncreated by
17
John Locke, 'Essay Concerning Human Understanding,"
Plamenatz, English Utilitarians, 17.
18Albee,
History of English Utilitarianism, 56.
19
William C. Harvard, Henry Sedwick and Later Utilitarian
Political Philosbphy, (Gainesville, 1957g, 29.

4'

is

it and that subjects are bound to
obedience only so long as their
rights are protected.20
Each of the contributors thus far
has made definite steps
in the direction of Utilitarian
principles yet there are numerous
variations at many points. The man
generally accepted as the
individual who draws most of thes
e into a unified whole is
David Hume, regarded by many scho
lars as the founder of Utilitarianism.
Like many founders, Hume is more
flexible in doctrine than most of
his successors. He does not use
the expression the greatest
happiness of the greatest number."
But if he does not name the
doctrine nor invent the sacred for
mula, he does provide his
successors with the word "utility
."
Sir Leslie Stephen said of Hume that
"the essential
elements of Utilitarianism are stat
ed by Hume with a clearness
and consistency not to be found in
any other writer of the
century" and that "from Hume to J.
S. Mill, the doctrine received
no substantial alteration."21
Utilitarianism must be v'.ewed above all
as a theory of
morals. The political doctrine
s advocated by a Utilitarian
philosopher are not more than the
conclusions he draws from his
moral premises and from certain othe
r propositions which rightly
or wrongly he believes to be generali
zations from experience.22
20
Ibid., 41.
21
Stephen, Enllish Utilitarians, 60.
?2Jere
my Bentham, An Introduction to the Prin
ciples of Morals
and Leglslation, (Baltimore, 1950; orig
inally London, 1-7911; 6.

19

It is iraperative therefore to first deal with Hume's theory of morals.
This serves as a representative summary of other moralists.

The

postulates are found in the third bca a of his Treatise on Human
Nature and also, in the Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals.
Hume altogether rejects egoistic hedonism, stating that one
does not approve or dissapprove of characteristics or actions because
they are or are not beneficial to oneself.

Thus it is clear that

Hume is not a simple hedonist as some later Utilitarians became.

He

nowhere asserts that pleasure is the only good and pain the principal
evil.

All that he does say is that men usually approve or disapprove

whatever, in the society in which they live is either pleasant or a
means to pleasure or else is painful or a means to pain.
not equate pleasure and goodness.23

He does

It is the primary importance

that he attaches to pleasure and pain, his opinion that a pleasure or
pain, no matter whose is as good or as evil as any other equal to
it that makes him utilitarlan.
Hume in his "Treatise on Human Nature," attempted to interpret
all phenomena of mental life on the basis of the principle of the
association of ideas.
theory of association.

David Hartley was the recognized founder of the
His Observations on Man his Frame, his Duty .

and his Expectations explains the influence of habit through the
operation of the association of ideas. These two agree in the
importance of this concept.
Hume in his theory of morals assigns great emphasis to the
role of sympathy, a tangential expression in association.
23Harvard, Utilitarian Political Philosophy, 31.
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syrpathy as the pleasure or pain we feel whenever we
contemplate the
pleasures or pains of other people.24 His moral
theory rests on the
psychological assumptions that sympathy is not a form
of egoism and
that moral sentiments (These are the plsures and
pains we feel
when we contemplate actions or characters witho
ut regard to any
benefit or injury that may result from them to ourse
lves or to
persons in whom we take special interest.) are a speci
es of
sympathy.
Hume's political theor) assumes the justice and stabl
e
government are advantageous to man. It is his belie
f that men
have an implicit idea of the utility of gcwrent
and that this
idea, as a motive for obedience, is powerfully reinf
orced by riiere
habit and prejudice, this leads him quite naturally
to the
conservative conclusion that it is best to submit
quietly to
whatever government we find Established in the count
ry in whIci
25
we live.
Habit and prejudice are strongest where society has
changed the least.

There is therefore a pres;Jmption against

change and a very strong presumption agLinst violent chang
e.
the most important of his political essays

In

Of the Original Contract,.

Hume says that though soft;e innovations must take place
, violent ones
are to be undertaken by no individual for they are
dangerous eve*
when attempted by the legislature.* This is the
conservative
doctrine of Nme.
24David Hume, "Treatise on Human Nature," Works
(London,
1879), 44.
2- Hume, "Treatise on Human Nature," Works, 27.
26Halevy, Philosophic Radicalism, 7.
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Hume's greatest service as a political theorist is his
indifference to questions of origin.
Ale to its basis of origin.

He seeks to justify no stata

As an historian he is, of course, as

interested in them as anyone else, but he does not wish to draw
political conclusions from them.

No matter how governments come

into existence, the present duty of obedience is always grounded
in utility.

"If the reason be asked of that obedience, which we

are bound to pay to government, readily answer, because society
could not otherwise subsist."27

It is the pragmatic thing to do,

without this status quo choas would reign.
Bentham and other utilitarians borrowed freely,
discriminately, candidly and gratefully from Hume.

They thought

that he had disposed of the myth of the original contract so
conclusively that the task need not be done again.
The French philosopher, Claude Adrien Helvetius in his
famous work Of The Spirit ;(De l'Espirit) exerted a significant
influence throughout Europe at the time of its appearance.
Following Hue's example, he "wished to treat morals like any
other science and to make an evperimental morality like an
experimental physics..28

He set up a moral determinism in many

ways similar to the principle developed by Montesquieu.

In

place of Montesquieu's physical and almost geographical determinism
Helvetius assigned morals as the determining factor.

Morals were

to exist in the interest of the public, that is to say of the
27Hume, "Of the Original Contract,"
Works, 4.
2RJohn Grate, An. Examination of the Utilitarian Philosophy.
(London, 1870), 3.
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greatest number and he made justice consist in
performing actions
useful to the greatest number. The fundamenta
l thesis of his book
was that interest alone can dispense the prais
e and blame attached
to actions and to ideas.
An aspect of the doctrine advocated by Helve
tius was that
the chief utility of government consists in their
ability to force
men to act in their own best interest when
they feel disinclined to
do so. This has been called by him and later
his followers the
artificial identity of interests.219 Another
idea of great
importance to the utilitarian doctrine is that
man's character
is entirely the product of his environment.

He thought man's

social environment was the most important singl
e factor in making
him what he is.

Whereas geography and climate, as Montesquieu

had said, are beyond human control, social envi
ronment is not.
"Man by acquiring knowledge of what he is
and what made him so,
acquires an almost unlimited Power to reform
his species. There
are in society two classes of people who can do
more than any
others to reform their fellow countrymen; they
are the pedagogues
legi
slators."30
and the
It is the responsibility of these to give
men the education and the laws that will enab
le them to attain
happiness. This becomes the very program of the
Utilitarian
Radicals.
The doctrine of Helvetius that morals and legi
slation,
well considered, are the same science, was taken
up by the Italian
29Helvetius, peuvr_es cpilipjf_tes_, "De l'Espiri
t" (Deux-Ponts,
1784), 3.
301b1d., 71.
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philosopher Cesare Beccaria, whose book Crim
es and Punishments
(TrW. to die delitti e delle pene) contains
the first Italian
version of the famous utilitarian phrase,
in the words, "the
greatest happiness for the greatest number,"
(la massima felicita
divisa nel maggior numero) as the main end
of all social
institutions.

In the first sentence of the first chapter of

his work, special stress is laid upon the
"utility of all society"
(utile alla societa). According to Beca
rria,
If we look into history we shall find that
laws,
which are or ought to be conventions between
most
part the work of the passions of the few
or the
consequences of fortuious or temporary necessit
y;
not dictated by a cool examiner of human
nature,
who . . . had this only end in view, the
greatest
happiness of the greatest number.31
Beccaria, like Bentham after him, proposed to
make the
scale of punishments correspond to the scal
e of crimes.

One of

his rules was that the punishments should
always be so contrived
that with the least possible pain to the culp
rit, they should
produce the greatest deteri-ent effect; anot
her, that punishments
should be certain and imediate; yet another,
that judges should
never interpret but should confine themselv
es to apply the law.32
,e
Consistently he applies the estimate of
the utility as the important
issue.
The utilitarian doctrine found in England
almost its final
expression in William Paley, whose account
of a utilitarian Cod
promoting the happiness of his entirely self
ish human creatures,
31

J. A. Ayer, Philosophical Essar_ (London, 1959
), 209.

32Jeremy Bentham, The Theoly_of Lf_gislation (Lon
don, 1831), 22.
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was intended to reconcile Eng
lishmen inclined to philosophy wit
h the
religion by law established in the
ir country.33 He is as much an
egoistic hedonist as any man
ever was. It is in God that Paley
finds
the conciliator of egoism and
Utilitarianism. Though Paley believ
es
that every man desires only his
own happiness and can desire no oth
er
man's except as a means to his
own, he also believes that God des
ires
the greatest happiness of the
greatest number of men.
Paley's God is the one true uti
litarian in the universe, fc
he desires men's greatest hap
piness for its own sake. Though
the
greatest happiness of the gre
atest number is desired for its own
sake by only one person, that
person happens to be omnipotent.
He
can therefore easily contrive
that His creatures shall desire
it as
a means to their salvation.34
As is noticeable Paley is more of
e
theological utilitarian.
Proteus Priestly, in an essay,
"The First Principles of
Government and on the Nature of
Political, Civil and Religious
1
Liberty," proposed to adopt,
as "grand criterium" to settle all
the questions of politics, "th
e good and the happiness of the
members, that is to say the
members of a state."35 He marvel
led
that the idea had until then
escaped the notice of so many wri
ters.36
Priestly lacked the steadfast
ness of purpose necessary to und
ertake
33Davidson, Political Though
t in England, 219.
34Wi'lliam Paley, The Princi
ples of Moral and Political
Philosophy (London, 1818), 78.
3;
-Proteus Priestly, "The First
Principles of Government and on
the Fatore of Political, Civil and
Religious Liberty" Richard Carlto
(ed.), Collected Ensays (New
n
York, 1955), 11, 131.
36Ibi
d., 139.
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the systematic application of the principle which he had or thought
he hdd discovered.

In fact this is the great barrier to each of the

above listed.

They had never systematized or codified their dissonancy

of knowledge.

This was to be the task of Bentham.

When one views the contents of the philosophy up to its
radical application its heart is amazingly invulnerable.

What it

means is that the true measure of a just social order is what it
does to people and nothing else.

The utilitarian's immediate

objectives were to abolish intolerable abuses of power by governing
classes and radically reforming on scientific principles the
haphazard blundering administrations which were assumed to be the
source of all evils.

Such a system by its nature and aims, is

evidently practical and conducive to the proper development of
the individual.
In moral and political philosophy these existing
contributions and rudimentary concepts were present when Bentham
sought to promulgate a new ideology.

It is essential to note

the void of originality for the initial postulates of Utilitarianism.
It is doubtful that Benthan and. his contemporaries were inventors,
for the principle of Utilitarianism had already been stated in
general form by the predecessors listed earlier in this work.

It

may well be that these ideas were nothing more than brilliant flashes
with little lasting value.

They had no sustaining power.

the deficiency of each that Bentham

saw

his opportunity.

It is in
What rakes

Bentham the most famous Utilitarian is that more than any other he
succeeded in connecting these insights and concentricly united them,

'•
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exhaustively applying them to the morals and legislation of English
life.

In his application of the principle of utility to the many

problems of his age he provided nineteenth-century England with a
philosophical basis for practical reform.

a

"IrArgrionelerw've.n.

CHAPTER II
Bentham, The Formative Years
In the library of the University College, London, in a
polished cabinet, is the clothed skelton of Jeremy Bentham.

It

wears a black cutaway coat, tight trousers, frilled shirt and tall
straw hat.

Bentham's will asked that the well -clad skeleton "be

displayed on each occasion when his friends and disciples meet
together" to commemorate the founding of the greatest happiness
system of morals and legislation.1

This is but one of the numerous

eccentric ideas proposed by what Crane Brinton called "the most
definitive thinker of English legislation.2

Bentham also suggested

but never implemented the scheme to use his deceased relatives as
decorative devices to encircle the drive near his home.
this as a practical innovation.
and the method very simple.
in air-tight containers.

He advocated

He felt that the purpose was valid

The expired relatives were to be placed

These were to have glass doors in order

that the waxed heads of the corpses might be constantly viewed by
friends and the family.

In this manner space was conserved and
deceased relatives never forgotten.3 What kink of psychological
anomaly would produce such a perverted sense of utility?

1 C. K. Ogden,
Jeremy Bentham (London, 1932), 144.
2Brinton, Ennlish Political Thoutt, 16.
3—I. H. Clark,
"Two Views of 9entham," Nation, Vol. 51
(September 11, 1B90), 210.
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Bentham was born in 1748, at the beginning of a new age
marked by the French, American and Industrial Revolutions.

He died

on June 6, 1832, the day before the royal assent to the Reform Bill,
the passing of which marked so certainly the triumph of his views
and those of the British middle class, of which he was a member.4
He was in many ways the most typical inte1lectu-1 of his age and
perhaps because of that became a prominent international figure.
So much was he to dominate the century in which he died that Leslie
Paul said of him at the end of it that he did not know of a single
law or reform effected since Bentham's day which could not be
traced to his influence.5 That is the verdict of posterity which
he would have cherished most.

Jeremy was born near Houndsditch.

Today it is a place of gown warehouses, shops and offices in the
city of London.6 At his birth it was a residential neighborhood
for the prosperous.
dense shade.

Beautiful homes lined the area covered by

If the utilitarian advocated the environmental

approach to personality development Bentham was predestined to be
40
ft

the introvert he became.

Separated from society by fences made of

shrubs, never to be a part of a total world but always to be
a.

segmented from it, he matured from a lonely childhood.
His father, Jeremiah Bentham, was a prim, precise,
conventional man determined to make his son a model of orthodoxy
4Charles
Milner Atkinson, Jeremy Bentham, His Life and Work
(London, 1905), 296.
5Paul,
English Philosophers, 179.
6
John Mac Cunn, Six. Radical Thinkers (New York, 1964), 91.
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with the whole set of opinions and prejudices it entailed.7

He had

viss'ns of young Jeremy as Lord Chancellor and almost from his first
breath of life began to rold the boy for his destiny.

He thought

that this son was an infant prodigy and later Jeremy was to recall
that he had discovered himself at the age of three, in his own
words, "seated at a table a reading desk upon the table and a'huge
folio on the reading desk a lighted candle on each side and myself
8
absorbed in my studies." The book was Rapin's History of England.
The elder Bentham expected his son to be a dutiful child,
a faithful communicant of the Church of England, a proud wearer of
the old school tie, a diligent student and admirer of English common
and statute law, an eloquent barrister and ultimately a source of
excellent leadership in Great Britain.

ire little boy trotted along

in the paths marked out for him, obediently and industriously,
9
but ever more doubtfully and miserably.
Jeremiah Bentham was not a very active attorney. He kept
10
only one clerk.
Most oft hi large and growng income came from
a shrewd speculation in real estate.
teach Jeremy himself.

He had ti;lte 'erefore, to

They began with Latin and Greek.

other instructors were added.

Gra„ally

The boy had lessons in violin anl at

five was scraping away at Corelli and Handel rm 1 miniature violin
7
Mack, An Odeyssey of Ideas, 33.
8
C. W. Everett, The Education of Jeremy Bentham (New York,
1931), 6.

.4

- Mack, An Odyss_ty of Ideas, 34.
10
Ibid

.„
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his father had made for him.

Jeremy also learned to play the

harpsichord and also was instructed in composition, drawing, Frenc
h,
close-order drill and dancing.

Soon he became an accomplished

musician and never lost his passion for music.

He was one of the

first people in England to own an improved "piano" and visito
rs to
his "Hermitage" at Queen Square Place were astonished to discov
er
an organ or piano in every room.

This love of music provided him

with a means of companionshin in the twilight years when his
poor
health limited his social life.
The French lessons were equally as successful as the piano.
Bentham enjoyed his tutor La Comte who, though fired within a year
over a salary dispute, tauont him so well that many of his early
manuscripts were written in French. 11 It was through his study
or
the French language that it was possible for him at age seven to
have his first vision of the perfect king.

His French instructor

had given him a copy of Fenelon's Telemacw, which had been writte
n
to tutor a king.

This left a profound and indelible mark on him.

He later said:
That romance (Telemaque) may be regarded as the
foundation-stone of my whole character; the starting
point from where my career of life commenced. The
first dawning in my mind of the princ5,ple of utility
may, I think, be traced to it. . .
In Fenelon's story Menter and Telemachus, in search of
Ulysses, land at Arete during an election to fill the vacant throne
.
11 H. L.
Beales, "Jeremy Bentham, Social Engineer," The
Listner, Vol. 91 (August 3, 193?), 149.
12
Bentham, Works, X, 10.
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After an athletic competition, the victorious candi
dates are
asked three questions.

In the answers to these questions Telemachus

indicates indirectly, according to Bentham, that
the happiest sovereign
is he who makes his subjects happiest.13
The most unhappy of all
men is a king who believes he shall become happy
by rendering
14
others miserable. .
Bentham's father wanted him to be pious but he was terri
fied
and repelled by religion.
be painful to be good.

He could never understand why it must

Morbid piety oppressed him, both as a child

unable to sort his jumbled emotions and as an old man
who had spent
a lifetime teaching a lighter, brighter morality.

It was during his

student days at Oxford that Bentham developed the
dismal view of
official religion that he never abandoned.

Later he would say:

Ask a man of orthodoxy anywhere, what is a fundamenta
l?
His answer comes to this--it is what I am most earne
st
about, ask him, how comes he to be so earnest about it?
It is because other people are. How come these other
people to be so? It is almost always because once
upon a time, two men having a dispute, one of them
having the worst of it but being the best intriguar,
grew angry and got the magistrate to oppress his
adversary.
They have made us subscribe to (Christ's) . .
descent into Hell, it is God's mercy they never
took into their heqds to make us subscribe to a
map of the voyage.15
As Bentham's small universe expanded, his dissatisfa
ctions
multipled.

He had been confinded to reading only those volumes

13
Ibid.
14
234.

Francois de la Mathe-Fenelon, Telemachus (New York, 1859)
,

1'Bentham, Works, X, 27.
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present in his father's library.

then he was seven his father enrolled

him as a boarder at Westminister School.
the most fashionable school in England.

In 1755 it rivaled Eton as
There were no dormitories, so

the boys lived in private houses arou
nd the school yard. Here
Jeremiah Bentham expected his son to
take the first steps from the
middle class to peerage, by making
connections, the usual path of
social advance in eighteenth -century
England when the political
structure was built on personal and fami
ly relationships. In this
cacial circle Jeremy moved well and foun
d himself at ease with the
upper class. Their mores were not so adve
rse to those from which
came.
In 1760 his father enrolled him, at
the age of twelve, at
Queen's College, Oxford, the youngest
student in the history of the
university.
Like Westminister, Queen's was fashiona
ble and Jeremy
was again expected to cultivate the
peerage.
During the eighteenth century a fog of
boredom hung over
Oxford. Degrees were given for resi
dence and the examinations
weee a farce. Candidates supplied
themselves with "strings," lists
of syllocisms that were passed on from
one student generation to
the next. They had only to memorize
them and their degrees were
assured. Then they met their examiner
s, they chatted amiably about
wines or horses or read a novel unti
l the clock struck eleven, when
the Master signed their testimonium as bach
17
elors of arts.
16
Mack, An Odyssey of Ideas, 43.
17
A. D. Godley, Oxford in the Eighteen
th Century (London,
1908), 139.
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Bentham hated his tenure at Oxford and
was almost completely
isolated.

•

He decried the dull routine of each day.

There were few public lectures and such
instruction
as I received was given by my private
tutor. .acob
Jefferson was a morose unimaginative peda
nt who
mechanically assigned lessons that I had
already done
at Westminster. Twice a day, at elev
en in the
morning and nine at night, I consulte
d with Jefferson.
At one the dinner trumpet blasted.
In the afternoon
I studied, took lonely walks in the
neighboring
countryside to collect plant specimens or
played
an occasional game of my favorite batt
ledore and
shuttlecock.w
He continued Mathew Arnold's "grand
old fortifying classical
curriculum," rounded off by lectures
in the Greek Testament and
oral disputations in Hall. The physics
course Bentham pleaded to
attend was disappointing. The instruct
or bungled almost every
experiment. He was even more eager
to hear the chemistry lectures
but was afraid to ask his father for the
extra fees charged to
19
attend.
This episode at Oxford may well have
set the mood of his
personality for the remainder of his
life. The solitude was
continued throughout his healthy year
s. He lived a simple, somewhat
severe life, never marrying and never seei
ng anyone except for some
specific purpose. His only relaxations
were music and gardening. He
knowingly labeled himself, "The Hermit
of Queen's Square Place."2°
Nurerous scholars, none qualified in
the study of psychology,
have atterr-4ed to eplain the introver
sion and masochism which
Bentham, Works, X, 37.
19Everett,
Education of Bentham, 26.
20
Bentham, Works, X, 509.

effected Bentham.

Throughout his career there is great empathy

expressed for leading personalities.
was a child in reverse.

Mack points out that Bentham

In 1821 he even wrote to Dumont, his

most faithful and effective editor, "Courage!
are growing young together.

Son of my mind:

we

At what pitch of juvenility may we not

have carried twenty years hence. 121
There are many hypothetical assertations which could be made
but with no assurance of validity.

The causation involved in the

eccentricties of Bentham remains speculative.

It is this aversion

to people which often resulted in disdain from the public, not his
radical ideas.

His ideas were opposed because of his image which

was detested by so many of rank and peerage.

But to be objective

one must admit that it was also this quality of life, the
withdrawal and seclusion, which attracted disciples to the disinterested "Hermit of Queen's Square Place."
assume asceticism was the causative factor.
theory.

It is invalid to
Bentham scorned this

From his utilitarian point of view, saints as he referred

22
to them were idle.

In fact, this principle was directly opposed

to the logic of the greatest happiness of the greatest number,
asceticism was in effect a glorification of unhappiness.

A complete

knowledge of all the negative aspects of his personality does not
indicate the cause, but one can summize that the loneliness of Oxford
becare the seclusion of Queen's Square Place.
21 Bentham

to Dumont, November 29, 1821, quoted in Bernard
Gognelien, "Jeremy Bentham et Stienne Dumont," University of London
Bicentenary Celebration (London, 1940, 53-54.
72
- Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Princi.Oes of Morals
and Leislation, Works, I, 174.
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Bentham's works and correspondence
are devoid of any record of
e personal friendships during his
college days. His attitude seems
xpress a maturity beyond his chronolo
gical age. The thoughts and
vities of his peers were beneath him.
This is not a reflection upon
al caste but his interests had been
molded and his routine of
tant study left little time nor desi
re to cultivate the classmates
he university.
Upon graduation from Oxford, Bentham
studied under
Mansfield, Chief of the King's Bench
from 1756 to 1788.23 It
- ore than mere personal magnetis
m which drew Bentham to Mansfield.
o one in England was honored, few were
more absurdly vilified in
popular press than this judge. He
was one of the chief victims of
is, who called him "the very wors
t and most dangerous in the
dom..24
This attack aroused Bentham's sens
e of justice and it is
ng this period he published his firs
t writings, three letters
▪ "Irenius" which appeared in the
Gazetteer, in 1770-1771. The
- A and third were defences of Lord
Mansfield, the first was an
anation of criminal law proceedure.25
The writing of these
r2rs opened up a new avenue of interest
for Bentham.
Well had his father's pride been exal
ted when Jeremy received
.aster's degree at eighteen. but he was
to grieve and be disappointed
s son's legal career. Jeremy exhi
bited little interest in the
"Mack, Odyssey of Ideas, 109.
24 Nich
olas Wraxall, Historical Memoirs of
tly On Time
, 1815), 245.
25
Baumgardt, Ethics of Today, 17.
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practice of law and his father was soon lamenting, that

he would

never be anything but the obscure son of an obscure attorney.

126

At Oxford Bentham had been caught up in the scientific
interests of his age.

If the law was to be his subject then he

proposed to approach it in the same spirit that Newton examined
the relationships of solid bodies and with, he began to hope, as
startling results for the world.
Bentham had been taught that he was to be great.

While

matriculating into Oxford he had been asked to define a genius.
This question he could not answer.

The event itself was a

traumatic experience which may have changed the direction of his
contributive life.

Over and over the question hounded him.

"Have I a genius for anything?"

Here Helvetius gave help in

presenting the etymolov of the word genius.
1-ci genere mearhng to produce.

the Latin
for BenthaP.

legislation?

"What can I produce?

It is found in

The question changed

Have I indeed a genius for

gave myself the answer, fearfully and trembling--

yes.,27
This in itself is the major issue exposed in this work.
In fact this is a basic problem of Benthamite scholarship.
Jeremy Bentham create a new philosophical dogma?

Did

Are the writings

attributed to him really the products of his own brillance or do
they represent the plagiaristic practice of one who made claims
to genius through the pens of others?
26

These formidable problems

Atkinson, .enemy Bentham, 66.

2/
Bentham, Works, II, 49.
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are to be discussed at length in the next chapter.

It is through

the discussions of Bentham's literary and philosophical career
that the remainder of his life will be viewed.

CHAPTER III
Bentham:

Genius or Plagiarist?

From the beginning Jeremy Bentham gave his attention
consi

ntly to the theoretical and practical reform of law;
it was

here he was finally to achieve prominence.

When Bentham revisited

Oxford in 1768 to record his vote at the University
Parliamentary
election, he found, in a little circulating libra
ry attached to
Harper's Coffeehouse, a copy of a pamphlet which
had only recently
been published, William Priestley's An Essay_ on
the First Principles
of Government and on the Nature of Polit
ical, Civil and Religious
1
Liberty.
In this pamphlet, he found the magic phrase, "the great
est
happiness of the greatest number." Bentham recor
ds his experience
in these words:
It was by that pamphlet and this phrase in it
that
rry principles on the subject of rorality, public
and
private, were determined. It was from that pamph
let
and that page of it that I drew the phrase, the
words
and the import of which have been so widely diffu
sed
over the civilized wor1d.2
At once Bentham made it his own.

He used it as the normative end of

government, "a principle constituting not only a ratio
nal foundation,
of all enactments in legislation and all rules and
precepts destined
for the direction of human conduct in private life. 3
"
1

Plamenatz, English Utilitarians, 60.
2Bentham, Works, X, 268.
3Bentham, A Fragment on Government, 34.
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In Priestly's Essay the greatest happiness principle
appears
as a natural right guaranteed by the social contr
act.

Men temporarily

gave up part of that right in the form of civil liber
ty when they
entered the contract but they retained the right
in the form of
political liber4, a share in political power which
gave them control
over their own happiness.

Priestley insisted that the principle must

not be used as an excuse for the intervention
of government or society.
On the contrary. .1 minimum of intervention and
regulation was most
conducive to the happiness of individual
s as well as of the greatest
number. Bentham was enamored by this conce
pt. "Priestly was the
first who taught my I
to pronounce this scared truth! That the
greatest happiness of the greatest number
is the foundation of
1
morals and legisiatin,
The phrase v'eich had impressed Bentham so much,
he may well
have found in William Priestley's work but Sir
Leslie Stephen and
Professor Elie Halevy agree in ascribing the
authorship to Sir Francis
Hutcheson. The phrase referred to by Benth
am, in Priestley, is as
follows: "The good and happiness of the membe
rs, that is of the
majority of the members of any state is the
great standard by which
everything relating to that state must final
ly be determined."5

The

Essay was filled with germane statements later
to be used by Bentham
but most of the leading critical scholarship
agrees that Bentham gave
credit to a source which actually did not
contribute that much to his
4
Bentham, Works, X, 142.
5Prote
us Priestley, An Essay on the First Principles of
Government and on the Nature cif Political,
Civil and Relilious
Liberty -Tindon, 1768), 17.
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career.

In his attempt to locate the point of discovery he in reality

looked too early in his philosophical maturation.
many other phrases are used from Priestley.

It is true that

"Promote the public

good . . ."6; "Consult the good of the whole . . ."7; The interest
. . . of the people, the happiness of the whole community is the
ultimate end of government."8 These are all statements later to
be used by Bentham.
Thus it was only by mere chance that Bentham first met
the principle of utility in a writing of the disccverer of oxygen.
Priestley himself indicates that this principle plays no greater
part in his work than in other moral, juristic and political
theorists cf the eighteenth century.

Mack may teil be correct in

saying that Bentham hastily attributed too murfn to Priestley.Bentham is aware of this too and relates in an unpublished
manuscript:

"Before it (the principle of utility) was mine it was

M. Beccaria's.

Before it was his it was Helvetius', before it was

Helvetius it was in some sOrt anybody's.

Enough''

Yet Bentham

was little interested in the merely "historical" queion as to who
had stumbled on the principle of utility before him.

Most likely,

he was first influenced on this point by Priestly but occasionally
6Ibid.,
18.
Ibid., 11.
8Ibid.,
59.
9Nack, On. Odyss.el of Ideas, 142.
10Bentha
m MSS, University College, London, Portfolio 27,
Folder 16, Sheet 100, 23, written about 1776. Found in Baumgardt,
Ethics of Tod, 37.
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he indicates much greater importance to Beccaria,11 Helvetius12 and
13
Hume.
The most conclusive statement to be used at this point is
the fact that the first thread is now in the hand of the
What he does with this principle is the key issue.
In Jeremy Bentham Utilitarian Radicalism had at last its
great man.

Under his leadership Utilitarianism formulated a

comprehensive philosophical system and a program of practical
reform.

The two are complimentary, however, inasmuch as the

reforms recommended were direct practical applications of the
philosophical fundamentals advocated by him.
As far as philosophical traditions go, it may be claimed
for Bentham and his school that they fit into the broad movement
of the English tradition of empiricism which was passed from
Francis Bacon to Hobbes, Locke, Hume, James Mill and on to John
Stuart Mill.14

Despite connections with empiriciLm in part of the

works of Bentham, however, the commentators on Bentham from Macauley
to the present have uniformly stressed the deductive nature of his
principles.

Utilitarianism at the hands of Bentham takes the form

of an elaborate interdependent system containing psychological,
moral, economic and political theories.
The all-embracing nature of the system is reflected strongly
in the sweeping practical reforms urged by the Utilitarians.

Bentham

Bentham, Works, III, 286.
12Ibid., X,
54.
13Bentham, Fragment,

XXXVI.

14Betrand
Russell, A History of Western Philosophy (New York,
1945), 774.
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was the philosopher of the Engl
ish reform movement in the early
nineteenth century and in conseq
uence, may be regarded as the founde
r
of modern English liberalism.
He provided the intellectual ammuniti
on
with which the philosophical Rad
icals in Parliament attacked what
they believed to be the stronghol
ds of reaction.
Bentham began his literary career
when his first published
work, Fragment on Government
was issued anonymously in 1776. Som
e
15
ascribed the book to Edmund Bur
ke.
Fraament on Government was
described as a comment on the Com
mentaries of Sir William Blackston
e
whose lectures Bentham had hear
d at Oxford. The Commentaries were
a popular and flattering e4osit
ion of the laws of England. To
Blackstone all law, whether sci
entific, social or even municipal
was derived from the law of God.
This Bentham could not accept.
Although there are numerous points
of divergence between
Blackstone and Bentham, clarifica
tion must be made at this point.
Bentham owed much to Blackstone.
From him Bentham developed the
arbitlon to systematize the law
and create a science of legislation.
{hey both der, ed the average
Englishman's ignorance of the law
and hoped tr each it in schools lik
e any other organized body of
knowleduo
Lielcksfr:ne was in fact the first Engl
ishman to write
a full systeri;atic analytic treati
se on the law. In acknowledging
his det to Blackstone Bentham said:
Through him I Trif)A what I know but
for him I might
very likely have known nothing.
But for him I miyht
never have bent my infant mind
to the forbidding
science. Through him I found ins
tead of disgust,
amusement. . . .
15Harvard, Henry_ Sedwick, 95.

,
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Setting out from the point at which he stopp
ed,
if in any point of view I should have happened
to
see further than him the merit may have been
more
his than mine, I may have been but the dwarf
upon
the Giant's shoulders. . . .
I have from nothing within the compass of
jurisprudence derived so much advantage as from
the
map of jurisprudence which stands prefixed to
his
analysis. . .16
Two Important concepts were taken by Bentham
from Blackstone's
Commentaries.

The first was the analytical device in the three-fold

division of conditions necessary for human actio
n which Blackstone
had listed.

The requirements of good government are wisdom,
prolixity

and power.17

Bentham extended this list to cover good or Utilitaria
n
18
behavior of any kind whatever.
The second instance in which Bentham
quoted Blackstone was his popular fiction of "offi
ce as public trust."
This is the key to Bentham's political theor
y, one which he used often
to open his discussions of power and its respo
nsibilities. Even in
his opposition to Blackstone Bentham found new threa
ds for his
utilitarian loom.

When his opposition was not sufficient to provide

him with further material he employed another
source but the end
product remained the same.

This fact is stressed simply to indicate
-

that Bentham utilized all contributors, even
those with whom he could
not agree.
Bentham opposed what he described as the "fict
ions of
contractual limitations on the powers of the
legislature" such as
1 6Penth

am, Works, VII, 128.

17
Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the
Laws of England
(Philadelphia, 1861) II, 181.
18
Bentham, Works, VIII, 141.
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19
those favored by Blackstone.

He gathered his general doctrine of

utility from David Humes destruction of natural law in the Treatise
of Human Nature, particularly from the third volume.

In the Fragment

on Government Bentham 'cells of his first reading of Hume.

After

reading the third volume of Hume's Treatise he relates,
No sooner had I read that part of the work which
touches on this subject than I felt as if scales
had fallen from my eyes, I, then, for the first
time, learned to call the cause of the people the
cause of virtue. . . . That the foundation of all
virtue is laid in utility, is there demonstrated,
after a few exceptions made, with the strongest
evidence; but I see not what need there was for
exceptions.A
It was to Hume that Bentham gave credit also for the
application of his principle.

The view that pleasure is the end

of human action agrees with the general thesis upheld by Hume.
Ask a man why he uses exercise, he will answer
because he desires to keep his health. If you then
inquire why he desires health, he will readily reply
that sickness is painful. If you push your inquiries
further and desire a reason why he hates pain, it is
impossible he can ever give any. This is an ultimate
end and is never referred to any other object.21
The above is found in Home's Enquiry into the Human Unde standini
which Bentham does not mention'in his works or published correspcndence.
It is obvious from the above that he drew from this source but gave no
credit to its correct location.
19

Bentham, Fraoment

268.

20David Hume, An Enquiry into the Human Understandi
William Babcock (ed.),—guii-le Treatises TAO-Mon, 19-0--TT,-- se-et-. IV
(no page number listed.)
21 Ibide
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A

Bentham does rely upon the Treatise of Human Nature and freely
gives credit.

He appealed in his Fragment on Government from the

notion of a Divine (ius Dei) and natural impulses or instincts of
mankind.

Bentham had used Hume to replace Blackstone's God with

natural impulse.
The chief contribution of this section on The FraT:ent is
not the argumentation used by Bentham but his source.

He received

mv_h praise for this small work, but in reality it was an exposition
of Hume.

There were few people Bentham admired more than this man.

He respected "that prince of historians" for his large-minded
tolerance and independence and his dispassionate, acute and
comprehensive mind.22 But in his acknowledgement as to the actual
source of his retort Bentham continued to weave, in silence usine
the available threads offered by the works of reliable scholars.
After the publication of Fraoment on Government recognition
came rather early in the rest of the world.

Bentham became an

international figure (he invented the word international) long before
23
fame came to him in Britain.
Bentham is one of those people who
verify the old adage that "a prophet has most honor out of his own
country."

His name was little known in England, better in Europe,

24
best of all in the plains of Chile.

He was made a French citizen

in 1792 and actually recorded a vote for Napoleon:25
22Bentham, Works, IV, 283.
23
Atkinson, Jeremy Bentham, 143.
94,
- 1-lalevy, Philosophic Radicalism, 188.
25Ihid., 19°.

Much of his

6

most famous work, Rationale of Punishments and Rewar
ds, which was
published in France fourteen years before its appea
rance in England.
The translator was the well-known French scholar
Etieene Dumont.26
In his thirty-eiahth year Bentham made the grand
tour.

In

Russia Prince Grigori Potemkin started what
oe hoped would be an ideal
agricultural and industrial community on the
steppes of Russia and
Bentham's brother, Samuel, was in charge of
its organization. While
in Russia he made his entry into the econo
mics of Utilitarianism by
writing Defense of Usury..27
In the discussion within this work he raises
the old question
as to whether moral and intellectual progress
can be found in the
history of mankind. ee shows himself an arden
t believer in a
constant advance of the human race. There is
an "uninterrupted
progress of mankind, in our island at least; among
all the different
periods of English history there is not one at
which the condition of
the country was more prosperous than that at the
present."28 In
cc - st to the ecoro ethical condemnation of
usury, Bentham defends
against Ada 7Jnith
om he otherwise most sincerely admired
and to whom, in the
economics, he felt largely indebted.
"You know," Bentham wrcte
-; friend George Wilson in December 1786
from Russia, "it is a_:1, old maxim of mine, that
interest, as love and
religion and so many other pretty things, shoul
d be free."29 More
?6Brinton, Enalish Political Thought, 207.
27Mack,
An Odessev of Ideas, 319.
28
Bentham, Works. V, 23.
26.
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consistent than Smith himself, Bentham applies Adam Smith's principles
of economic liberalism even to free trade in money, by showing that
there is neither a moral nor economic reason for Smith's objection to
usury.
He enters into a discussion even of the religious, the
philosophic-historical and the literary-historical grounds for the
rise of the inveterate prejudice against free trade in money.

He

mentions, for instance, that on the religious side lending money
at high price was obviously considered to be "acting like a Jew."3°
Though all Christians at first were Jews and continued
to do as Jews did, after they had become Christians,
yet, in process of time, it came to be disovered, that
the distance between the mother and the daughter church
could not be too wide. Indeed the easier method of
getting money as a Christian and a method pretty much
in vogue was to let the Jews get the money any way they,1
could and then squeeze it out of them as it was wanted.'
Certainly, such religious reasons often given for the objection to
usury provii:e no basis for the Christian accusations against usurers.
Within the history of philosophy, Bentham regards Aristotle
as especially responsible for the defamation of usury.
had stated that all money is in its nature barren.32

For Aristotle
In defiance of

the old despotic empire of Aristotle over the Christian world, Bentham
dares to say:
the practical inference from this shrewd observation,
if it afforded any, should have been, that it would,
be to no purpose for a man to try to get five percent
out of money-not, that if he could contrive tc get so
30Ibid.,
16.
31
Ibid.
32Ibid.
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much, there would be any harm in it but would not
two
sheep or other useful animals a man could buy for
borrowed money probably not be barren.33
At any rate, Aristotle's reference to barrenness
as an intrinsic
"quidditas" of money is in no way more conclusive
than any reference
to other seemingly fixed, intrinsic qualities
of things.
Lastly, Bentham observes that in the history of literature
:
from the days of Thespis selfish affections conspiring
with the social prevent justice from being done
to the
man of thrift, the moneylender and treasure
up all favor
for the borrower. This precisely mirrors the
feelings
of the inconsiderate that is the great mass of manki
nd.
All children who have eaten their cake are
the natural
enemies of the children who have theirs and the
former
benefactor of mankind who lent money changes his
nature inevitably in the eyes of the inconsider
ate
crowd and becomes instead of a benefactor, a tyran
t
and oppressor.34
After the appearance of Bentham's polemic, Smith admit
ted
that his support of usury laws was incompatible
with his own general
principles of free trade. Moreover, this second
small publication of
Bentham attracted even more public attention than
his first one, as
several editions and translations in the eight
eenth and the beginning
of the nineteenth centuries show.
that 3entham's Defence of Usuny,

As late as 1848 J. S. Mill maintained
this triumphant onslaught [made upon

usury laws] may still be referred to as the best exta
nt writing on the
subject.''35
In 1788 Bentham returned to England, where he soug
ht to fulfil
the aspirations of his father.

He desired a means to make a political

331bid.
34IVd., 17.
35John Stuart Mill, Principles of Political Econ
omy,
(London, 1852), II, 510.
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career.

Disappointed in this he set
to work again on the principle
s
of legislation. In 1789 the
re appeared the consummation
of a long
intellectual process whose
stages are briefly seen. Ben
tham published
his great work, Introduct
ion to the Principles of Mor
als and Legislation.
The previous manuscripts
had been the products of the
Bentham
mind but this work would
be discussed often, even to
the present. How
much of the contents were
solely Bentham's? Was it possib
le to retrace
his sources and vendicate
the solemn declaration of his
own peers?
Mr. Bentham, perhaps, overrates the importance of his
own theories. He has been
heard to say that he should
like to live the remaining
years of his life, a year
at a time at the end of the
next six or eiaht centuries,
to see the effect which his
writings would by that time
have had upon the world.
Alas! his name will hardly
live so long. Nor do we thi
nk, in point of fact, that
Mr. Bentham has given any
new or divided impulse to
the human mind. . . . Mr.
Bentham's forte is
arrangement 36
On the question of Bentham's
heritage the fictions seem to
multiply. It is impossible
to say with John Stuart Mill,
"Bentham
failed in deriving light fro
.37
m other minds.
Yet it would be
erroneous to say he was alt
ogether unoriginal, the only
light he
had, he borrowed from others
. Somewhere between these ext
remes a
careful formsgeschichte pos
itionalizes the student of Ben
tham.
The magnum opus, Introduction
, opens with an obvious
plagiarism. The statements
are copied verbatum from Hel
vetius.
Bentham's verson reads as fol
lows:

193.

36William Hazlitt, The Spi
rit of .the. ARe (London, 1825),

37
F. R. Leavis (ed.), "Benth
am," Mill on Bentham and
Col
ere
dge
(Lo
ndon, 1950), 58.
_
_

Nature has placed mankind und
er the goverance of two
sovereign masters, pain and
pleasure. It is for them
alone to point out what we
ought to do, as well as to
determine what we shall do.
On the one hand the
standard of right and wrong,
on
the other the chain of
causes and effects, are fas
tened to their throne. . . .
The principle of utility
recognizes this subjection and
assumes it for the foundatio
n
of which is to rear the fab of that system, the object
ac of felicity by the hands
of reason and of law. . .
Helvetius in his De l'Espirit
makes the following statement
.
it seems that God has sai
d to man . . . I give to you
reason, it is by this blind
instrument of my wishes,
incapable of knowing the dep
ths of my perception, that
you should, without knowing
it fulfill my desires. I
place you under the guard of
both pleasure and pain,
the one or the other to guide
your thoughts, your
actions, engendering your
passions, your tenderness,
your furies, your hates, all
uring your desires, your
fears, your hopes, to reveal
some truths, to plunge
into some errors and after
having begun a thousand
different and absurd system
s of morality and legislation, you will one day dis
cov
principles, to which are att er the simple
a0ed the order and the
goodness of the moral world.
3
Other concepts and sections
are mentioned indirectly in
Bentham's theories:
It is necessary to be 'ab
le, considering all things . .
.
to understand that all law
s Ce from one simple law,
3eBentham, Works, I, 154
.
39Helvetius, "De l'espirt,
" Oeuvre:. -rnol: -5., 293. The
lowing is the paragraph use
fold by Bentham fr.i)m this Jurce:
"Ii semble
que ... Dieu ... ait dit
a 1 home: Je te doue dela sen
sibite;
c'est par elle qu' aveugle
instrument de mes volontes', - nca
pable de
connaitre la profondeur de
mes vues, tu doi“ sans !e savoir
, remplir
tous mes deseins. Je te met
s sou
douleur; l'un et l'autre veille s la garde du plaisir et de la
rnat a tes pensees, a tes
tens;
engendreront tes passions,
exciteront tes aversion, tes ami
ties, tes
tendresses, tes fureurs; te
devoilerant des virites; te plo
ngerant danL
des erreurs; et apres t avo
ir fait, enfanter mule system
es absurdes et
differens de morale et de
legislation, te decouvriront un
jour les
principes simples, au develo
peement desquels est attach' l'o
rdre et le
bonheur du monde moral."
•
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that which is besl,for the greatest number of men, this
is utility. . .
The principle of a good morality
must be based on that which is best for the public
interest, which is best for the greatest number. . .
Justice consists in the institution of actions for
the good of the public. A man is just so long as all
his actions support the public good. Utility is the
principle of all human truth and the foundation of
all legislation.41
None of the books Bentham read had a more profound impact
than Helvetius De l'Espirt.

In the hundreds of character sketches

that Sainte-Beuve drew he always sought to center them on a man's
dominant passion.

Here Bentham found that legislation arched high

above all that man did.

For the first time he began to understand

the place of the law in society and his own relation to it.

"Other

arts and Sciences take in hand each a particular and narrow division
of human action.

Jurisprudence extends its view over every specie-.
of act whatever."42
Bentham says of Helvetius and his contribution to this new
view of law.
The year was to be a most interesting year, . . . I
was beginning to get gleams of practical philosophy.
40Ibid., 159, "Il faut—pouvoir, rapportes toutes
les
lois.... A un simple, tel que celui d 1 utilite du public, c' est-adire du plus grand numbre d' homes."
41. •
74, "... Les principes d' une bonne morale ...
doivent tolijours entre appuzes
sur
interet public,
c'est a dire celui du plus grand nombre.... La justice ...
Consiste ... dans la piratique des actions utiles au plus grand
nombre.... Un home est juste, lorsque toutes ses actions tendent
an bien public.... L'utilite' est le principe de toutes vertus
humaines, et le fondement de toutes les legislations."
42Centham M.S.S. 27, folio 2, Ca. 1776, found in Baumgardt,
Ethics of Tod, 167.
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Montesquieu, Barrington, Beccaria and Helvetius but
most of 411 Helvetius, set me on the principle of
In a comment in the Bentham MSS he said, "as you will see, my system
A

is based on the ideas of M. Helvetius..44
It is difficult at this point to be exact on all the
contributions of Helvetius, but it was not from Helvetius that
Bentham was to gain his principle of utility.

This involves another

incident of plagiarism for he draws from Beccaria in his Of Crime
and Punishments (Dei Delitti e delle Pene).

The statement found in

Bentham's introduction is very similar to that found in Beccaria.
By the principle of utility is meant that principle
which approves or disapproves of every action whatsoever, according to the tendency which it appears to
have to augment or diminish the happiness of the
party whose interest is in question or what is the
thing in other words to promote or to oppose that
happiness, I say of every action whatsoever and
therefore not only of every action of private
individual but of every measure of government.''
This is like Beccaria's.
If 2aF:Jre de._ '
Jain re the moving powers of
sentient beings . . the wise legislator will be
content to indicate the chief division on the scale
without upsetting its order and inflicting punishments cc the lowest degree or crimos of the first
degree.46
43
Bentham, Works, X, 54.
41_
6entham, MSS, 169, 50, Ca. 1778, found in Baumgardt,
Ethics of Today, 170.
45Bentham, Works, 154.
1.16Beccaria, Dei Delitti e delle Pene. The Italian is as follows:
tra
"Il piacere e ii dolore—S-Ono i motori degli esseri sensiliiii
motivi che spingono gli uomini anche alle piu sublimi opera2.ioni, furono
destinati doll l'invisible Legislatore ii preimo e la pena.'

Bentham and Beccaria both used the conc
ept of utility to
measure all things. In practically
all the discussion of various
crimes and punishments which fills
the different chapters of
Beccaria's work, the estimate of the
utility of the punishment in
question appears as the most importan
t issue.
Beccaria says that the question of the
value of the
punishment must be found in its effect
upon the total society.
The value and utility of the penalty
is found only as it serves
as a deterrent in relation to the rema
ining members of society.
The constructive nature of punishme
nt is not found in what it
does or does not do to the individu
al, only to the group as a whole.
This is the issue so central in Bent
ham's legislative program.47
There are two points to remeeber in
the definition listed
above by Bentham even though he
took them from Beccaria. In the
first place, Bentham distinguishe
d as little as possible between
the problem of morals and the prob
lem of legislation. "By the
hands of reason and of law' and ever
y measure of government, morals
and legislation have the same prin
ciple, the same method."48 Morals
to Bentham, in the wide sense can be
defined as the;
art of directing men's actions to the
production of
the greatest possible quantity of
happiness on the
part of those whose interest is in
view. Either the
man whose actions I intend to direct
is myself, in
47Ibid
. In Beccaria the following stresses
the same issue:
Questa intutile prodigalita di supplize
r, che non ha mai resi migliori
gli uomini, mi ha spinto ad esaminar
e Sc la sia veramente utile e
guista in un gouerno bene organizzato.
... Ho detto che la prontezza
della pena e pui utile.... L'altra
questione e, se sia utile il
mettere a prezzo la testa di unuomo
conoscruto reo."
40

'Bentham, Works, I, 142.
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which case morals is the art of governin
g myself or
private morals or else the men whose acti
ons I intend
to direct are men other than myself.
In this case, if
they are net adults, the art of governing
them is called
education, which is either private or publ
ic, if they
are adults, the art of directing thei
r actions so as to
produce the greatest happiness of the grea
test number
appertains to legislation, if the acts of
the government
are of a permanent kind or to administ
ration, If they are
of a temporary kind dictated by circ
umstances.'
'
-9
Thus Bentham certainly appears to make
legislation a special branch of
morals but it is necessary to see in
what sense he understands morals.
It is legitimate to say that he uses
synonymously the concepts of
morals and legsl tion, He writes,
in language directly inspired by
Helvetius that the business of governme
nt is to promote the happiness
of society by penishing and rewarding.50

.4

Secondly, the end which Bentham had in view
was to found for
the first time, the art of morals and legi
slation on an objective
science of behavior. The principle
of utility differs from the other
moral precepts which have been successi
vely put forward, in that it is
the expression not of a subjective preferen
ce of the moralist but of
an objective law of human nature.51
It is not susceptible of dieeet
proof, since that which is used to prov
e everything cannot itsr
proved. But it is an empirical fact
that there is not, nor
ever been a living human creature so
stupid or so perverse as
co
have referred to it in many if not in
most of the decisions 7
It
is a principle which men habitually adopt
and apply without giving ii a
49Ibid., 144.
co
35.
51 David
Lyons, Forms and Limits of Utilitarianism (Lon
don,
1965), 131.
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thought.

Hence the principle is
subject to at least indirect
proof.52
The principle of utilit
y approves or disapproves
of actions as they tend
to augment or diminish
the happiness of the ind
ividuals under
consideration. Consequen
tly, to say that all ref
er unconsciously to
the principle of utilit
y is to say that all men
consider happiness
as a quantity, pleasures
and pains as values which
are arithmetically
calculable and the end
s of human action as a pos
sible object of science.
In short, it is only
the principle of utility
which can act as a
criterium in morals and
in legislation and be the
basis of a social
science.
Not only did Baccaria
give Bentham his formula
of the
"greatest happiness of
the greatest number," (l
a mass ima felicita
divisa nel maggior num
ero) but it is also from
Beccaria that Bentham
perceived the first ele
ments of his moral calcul
us. A perception
resulting in great adm
iration for the instructo
r.
Oh. my Master, first
eva
have raised your Italy noelist of Reason, you who
would add above France so far above England and I
, were it not that Helvet
ius,
without writing on the
sub
assisted you and had pro ject of laws, had already
vided you with your fundam
ideas. . . . You who
ental
have made so many useful
excursions into the pat
h of utility, what is the
left for us to do?
re
Never -to turn aside from
that path.53
Bentham later gives cre
dit to Beccaria for his ing
redients used in
the implementation of the
calculus itself.
It was from Beccaria's
little treatise on crimes
and
punishments that I drew
, as I well remember the
first
hint of this principle,
which the percision and
clearness
52
Halevy, Philosophic Rad
icalism, 129.
53
Bentham MSS, Universit
y College, No. 27, found
An Odessy of Ideas,
in Mack,
21.
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and incontestableness of mathematical calculation are
introduced for the first time into the field of morals
and legislation, a field to which in its own nature they
are applicable with the propriety no less incontestable
and when once brought to view manifest, than that of
physics.54
In laying down the rules of his felicific calculus Bentham
tried to construct a kind of mathematical morality analogous to
mathematical physics.

In seeking the principle of a natural classifi-

cation of motives and of crimes, he proceeds as does a doctor who is
classifying a disease.
How can the calculus be applied to the affairs of morals?
The ends which the legislator has in view are pleasure and the abcence
of pain.55

He must therefore know their value.

The instruments

which he has to employ to realize these ends are also pleasures and
pains.

The four sanctions enumerated by Bentham, in the t!jrd

chapter of the Introduction, the political, the moral, the religious
and the physical are all reducible to the last and all consist in
the hope of certain pleasureo and fear of certain pains.56

The

value of these, from this point of view also, should be known to
the legislator.

Hence the science of legislation ilruposes as its

first condition, the possibility of a quantitative comparison uf
pleasures.
Elie Halevy says that all the English moralists, from Hobbes
to Bentham, played their part in elaborating the rules of this
'4

548entham, Works, III,
286.
55Ibid., I, 15.
56Ibid., 16.

57
calculus; Bentham simply worked
out the results.57 It is true Bentha
m
did not conceive of
the enumeration of these four san
ctions. His debt
to most of moralists mentioned in
Halevy is emphemeral or vague but his
debt to John Gay is specific.
As a matter of fact, almost the same
list of "sources of pains and
pleasures" or moral obligations used
by
Bentham is found in Gay's Prelim
inary Dissertation Concerning the
Fundamental Principle of Virtue
or Morality.
The moral obligation is evidently
founded upon the
Prospect of Happiness. . . . Thi
s obligation may be
considered four ways, according
to the four different
manners in which it is induced;
first, that obligation
which ariseth from perceiving the
natural c.nsequences
of things, the consequences of
things acting according
to the fixed Laws of Nature, may
Secondly, that arising from mer be called Natural.
it or demerit, as
producing the Esteem and Favour
of our Fellow creatures
or the contrary, is usually sti
led virtuous. Thirdly
that arising from the authority
of the civil magistrate,
civil. Fougthly, that from the
authority of God,
Religious.'°
The definitions of the four san
ctions were thus no more original
with
Bentham than the formulation of
the utility principle.
Halevy makes the Valid assump
tion that in the development of
the dimensions or measurement of
pain Bentham used a multiplicity of
sources. For example, Hobbes spe
aks of three "dimensions" of pleasure
and pain; duration, intensity,
extension.
Good and bad, pleasure and pain,
if they are compared, do
indicate that which is better or
worse, because it is duration or
57Hal
evy, Philosophic Radicalism,
179.
58john Gay, Preliminary Disser
tation Concerning the
Fundamental PrinciTle of Virtue
or Morality, prefixed to
Edmund Law's translation of -Viill
iam—king, An Essai on the
Origin of Evil, 1895, XXVIII.

length aS the whole part which is important.

Also it is better or

worse because of the degree of intensity and better because of its
spread:39
The perspective given by the above comments offers an
adequate comparison of Bertham's evaluation.

He stressed that the

value of a pleasure or pain will be c2reater or less according to the
following: (1) its intensity (2) its duration (3) its certainty or
uncertainty (4) its orcpinquity or distance]

These, according to

Bentham, are the four elements or elsewhere the four dimensions of
pleasure or pain.60 Very similar to Hobbes, tut the value of a
pleasure or of a pain, considered in relation to pleasures and pains
which may follow or accompany it varies according to two other
circumstances: (5) its fecundity, the chance it has of being
followed by sensations of the same kind (6) its purity, the chance
it has of not being followed by sensations of the opposite kind.
these six elements a seventh must be added.

To

This involves the extent

of a pleasure, the number of persons to whom it extends.61

These

elements in the formula of the greatest happiness for the greatest
number create a scientific basis for the objective elaboration of
specific areas of pleasure.

Here the Newtonian principle of

"relationship" is realized.
— Hobbes, Works, Opera Philosophic ouae latine scriTsit
(Loodon, 1839), 102. The following is Hobbes' dimensions of pleasure,
pain: "Bona et mala si comparentur, majus est, caeteris parilius, quod
est deieturnius, ut totem parte, Et quod, caeteris parilius, vehementius,
oh eandem causam, quod pluribus bonum, quam quod paucioribus. Nom
generalius et specialius differunt ut majus et minus."
60Bentham
Works 1$ 30.
61 Ibid.

59

For the individual who accepts the principle of utility, the
value of an act consists in the pleasures and pains which result from
it.

The motive is always a pleasure or a pain, a pleasure which one

expects to see continued or produces by an act in question, a pain
which one expects to see stopped or prevented.

"Pleasure, in itself,

is a good, it is inde2d the absolute good..62 Pain, in itself, is an
evil, it is indeed the absolute evil.
Bentham described a curious dream about the time he was
finishing his Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation.
As I was musing one night in flew an angel at my
window I forgot his name--but it would be as easy
to learn it in heaven where he is as well known for
the implacable enmity he bears to the demon of
Chicane as S' Michael is by the battles he has had
with Satan. He put into my hands a book which he
said he had just been writing with a quill of a
Phoenix. It was lettered on the back Principle of
Legislation.63
This candid self-ridicule of the young Bentham certainly shows no
blind overestimation of what is, perhaps, his most important work.
Yet is is just as accurate analysis of the oridin of this masterpiece
as to say that it was original with Bentham.

It is evident from the

previous listing of sources that Bentham did not invent the moral
arithmetic, the elements of which are to be found in Beccaria, in
Hobbes and Gay.

He did not invent the principle of utility, the

formula of which is to be found in Hume.

He did not invent the formula

of the greatest happiness of the greatest number which occurs in
Priestley, Hutchenson and Beccaria.

t4

The most valid statement is that

62Ibid.
6?
•
-Bentha-1
MSS, University College, London, Portfolio 169,
Polder XIII, 76, found in Baumgardt, Ethic of Toda, 166.
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he borrowed them from the current language of contemporary thought.
Bentham's genius was expressed in his ability to arrange ideas.

It

was due to his aptitude for logical arrangement that, by reducing to
formulae the current philosophy of his country and his century, he
succeeded in forming a school which could unite in the profession a
common doctrine.
Bentham served as a translator of an epistemological
;,1
e1

discipline into a sociological instrument.

He took the philosophic

concepts from the "ivory towers" of the scholar and brought it into
the market place of political and sociological change.64
64Any
discussion of Bentham would be incomplete if some
reference were not made revelant to the problems posed in other
areas of Benthamite scholarship. Gertrude Himmelfarb indicates
that the editorship of John Bowring makes it almost impossible
to recreate the real Bentham. The depletion by Bowring often
cast a shadow of Bentham not found in the historical figure.
New MSS now being used in the publication of a 32 volume work
containing the complete works and correspondence of Jeremy
Bentham will shed much needed light on this area of Bowring
editorship. The "Tory interpretation of history" has also
distorted the true image of Bentham. It is safe to say that
this also is currently undergoing a radical revolution. Toe
problems of Benthamite scholarship are extensive and coNlicated.
This reference is made to indicate the writers awareness of
these issues. These, of course, are not basic issues in tAs
paper which deals in only one aspect of the total problem,
that is the issue of Bentham's -originality and practical infinence
in nineteenth-century English history. Consult for further
discussion Gertrude Himmelfarb, "Bentham Scholarship and the
Bentham Problem," The Journal of Modern History, vol. 41 (June.
1969), 189-206.

CHAPTER IV
Bentham's Pedicalism
Jeremy Bentham, at the age of sixty, was
known by a
relatively small number of the English publ
ic.

To a select few he

was a theorist and reformer of the scie
nce of law.

For the wider

public, he was principally and almost excl
usively the man who wrote
the Panoptican. In his own Works Bentham
says that in 1808 he made
the acquaintance of James Mill, a friendsh
ip of lasting value to
radicalism. He points out that this was
the highlight of that year.1
But of greater significance in that same
year was the failure of his
Panoptican proposal. Bentham might well
have considered his
philanthropic campaign a lost cause. He
was growing old and had
every reason to ask himself whether his
life had not been a failure.
You have not convinced me, you are grea
tly mistaken. I
fear that ry power of being useful has
diminished. I
have no apprehension of a constructive natu
re. I have
desired that my project so beneficial to
the public
should be used of the House of Parliment.
That is
exactly what I believe will never be done
. This has
laid on the table of the House, they have
refered it
to committees and now it is lost.2
Bentham had spent nearly a quarter of a cent
ury over his scheme
for prison reform. The beginnings go
back as far as 1790, when his
brother Samuel Bentham's return to England gave
him a competent
1Bentham, Works, IX, 107.
2Bent
ham to Lord St. Helens, January 5, 180S, Bentham
Works, 430.
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collaborator for the
architectural part of
the project. Since 1791
,
Bentham had been in
negotiation with the Ho
use. They had encouraged
him to take up the
project in the beginnin
g. He was now embitter
d
by the failure of th
e 9overnment to accept
. his work. They refuse
d
the Panoptican becaus
e Parliament believed
that a prison should no
t
be operated for privat
e profits. Bentham sp
ent the fortune his
father left him on
his project and an ul
timate award of 23,000 po
unds
by way of compensati
on from Parliament, ha
rdly repaid him for th
e
time spent on it. Wi
lburforce wrote about
this:
Poor Benthz,m . .
dyin
Never was aryone wors g of sickness and hope differed.
e
tears run down the ch used than Bentham. I have seen
eeks of that strongmind
ed man
through vexation at
th
and the insolence of e pressing importunity of creditors
offical underlings. Whe
day he was begging
n day after
at ttle Treasury for wh
at was, indeed,
a mere ratter of ri
ght.J
The insulted philan
thropist, the unrecogniz
ed inventor,
projector who had been
rejected could have fall
en into a melancholy
state. Eut Bentham
was too innovative fo
r that. He only modified
or to be more exact,
completed his philosop
hy under the pressure of
circumstances. He thr
ew the responsibility
for his mortification on
the King, who, he im
agined, had not forgot
ten his writings of 1789 4
.
He also directed the
responsibility to the
lethargy and egoism of
the
entire aristocratic
caste. Hrf remembered
with irony the days of
his
youth, when, as a re
former, ne thought th
at it would suffice to
enlighten the aristocr
aii in order to conver
t it to ideas of reform
.
3Pa
u, English Philosophe
rs, 180.
4Bentham, Works, X,
422, 624.
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He was FAstaken and he
now understood that the aristo
cracy was in
its essence hostile to ref
orm.
These are some of the second
ary causes which made the evolut
ion
of Bentham's thought tak
e a democratic direction. The
re are proximate
causes also which hastened
the evolution which, in abo
ut 1808, gave to
it the nature of a sud
den revolution. Until this
time, Bentham found
himself by the force of
circumstances in relations wit
h the Whig party.
It was in Spain, Portug
al and in South America tha
t the work of Bentham
and Dumont secured the lar
gest sale. Here his method
was to effect a
revolution. He wished to
codity his material rationall
y and subject
them to emperical verifi
cation, to measure them agains
t an external
and invariable standard.
He worked resourcefully and
at length to
introduce into political
and moral subjects the same sci
entific
methods used on physics and
mathematics.
At this juncture his apa
thy of the democratic idea was
displaced. The spirit of
Corporation was by definitio
n, hostile to
the principle of general
utility and the political ari
stocracy was a
closed corporation. For man
y years, Bentham had suffered
from the
indifference which this ari
stocracy had expressed to his
philanthropic
projects. He was now liv
ing at Westminister, the ver
y center of the
democratic agitation.5 It
was here he had made the acquai
ntance of
James Mill and through him
, Sir Francis Purdett.
These are the many forces
which act as a catalystic agent
to
stimulate the rapid change
s in Bentham. In the interval
of ten years
between Sir Francis Burdet
t's first speech in 1809, which
preceeded
Plamcnatz, Enalish Utilitarians
, 176.
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and prepared the way for Bentham's
first pamphlet on reform (Elements
on Parking) and Sir Francis Burd
ett's second speech delivered in 1818
which was the result of his coll
eboration with the head of the
Utilitarian school. Bentham now beca
me the philosopher of the party,
the chief thinker of Radicalism.6
Bentham saw English law as bein
g still medieval in its
complexity and especially in the
moral absolutes on which its criminal
code was based. He was unquestionab
ly the chief agent in initiating
its adjustments to the England of the
'
Industrial Revolution.
In
civil law, he insisted on efficiency,
on the diminution by codification of the conflict of law, on the
diminution of delays, on the
simplication of procedure, or dimi
nution of the expenses of litigation,
on the special need of adjustment
of English law to the new world of
capitalist business, at bottom, his
position here as elsewhere is that
of eighteenth -century rationalism.
If men will only think as clearly
and as unemotionally about law as
they do about physics. all will be
well.
Bentham was radical because he went
to the roots not only of
the law but of language itself
And because he went to the roots of
language, therefore he went to the
roots of all men's thoughts. His
writings are filled with constant
lament against the "tyranny of
language' and the "ambiguity of lang
uage." He wished the language of
politics and morality to be as rigo
rously scientific as was mathematics.
Halevy, Philosophic Radicalism,
251.
7Brinton, En21ish Political Thou
Ght., 22.
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Bentham, convinced that the great diff
iculty lies in the nature of
the words was concerned with etymolog
y and was constantly creating
neologisms.
The radicalism of Bentham is expresse
d in his desire for
annual parliaments:
In the event of misconduct, the
remedy is by a better
choice. In the case of annuality,
behold promptitude
is maximized. .
. In respect of expense, in case of
excess and consequent pressure, temp
tation to venility.
In the case of annuality, behold here
the temptation
to expense is minimized. Under annu
ality, for the
purpose of conception-hunting, scar
cely would it be
worth the while, of a man deficient in
probity, to
offer himself a second time to choi
ce, thereby exposing
his character to scrutiny. . . .
Under annuality, -in
the election of the second year, ever
y representative,
who has served the first year will
in respect of
presumable aptitude, have, in this
respect, the
advantage of every or proposed cand
idate, who has
not as yet served . . . on the grou
nd of general
principles, were the advantages on the
side of
annuality ever so slight--or even alto
gether wanting-especially when it is considered that
, under the
original system, not only was it actu
ally established
but the good effects of it were even
at that time so
manifest and undeniable can it be othe
rwise than that
some grounds--some specific and dete
rminate grounds-most, in support of such alleged pref
erence, be
produced at all?8
He saw only good and positive resu
lts in an aspect of a system already
valid in its present conditions.

Lords:

Bentham advocated the abolition of the
monarchy and House of
•

Of the maxium of inequality, every monarchy
affords an
example, of the matter of wealth, to the
monarch is
alloted a mass as great as suffices for
the subsistence
of from 10,000 to 100,000 of the individu
als from whom,
8Bent
ham, Works, III, 522-523.
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amongst otlws after being produced by thei
r labour, it
is extoled.
. . . With respect to the monarchy, inst
ead of unity
there is repugnancy. Between every anim
al of prey on the
one part and the animals preyed upon the
other, a certain
community of interests has place. It
is the interest of
the commander of an invading arry, that
not only subsistence
but abundance should have place in
the greatest possible
quantity wherever he makes his inroads.
.
Fyactly of
the same sort is the interest which the
monarch has in
common with his subjects.
In a monarchy, be the conduct of the
ruler ever so
mischievous, the difficulty of dislocat
ing is prodigious
and scarcely ever can any change be effe
cted without either
a homicide or a war, whereas in a repr
esentative democracy,
the rulers may be and continually are,
all of them together
though it be merely in the way of nrec
aution and without
evil actually experienced at their hand
s, dislocated with
as much facility as a servant is by
his
master, in domestic
life. 10
Bentham supported the implementation of
the secret ballot:
Let but the direction given to the vote
be completely
unknown to all but him who gives it.
There were advocates of female as well
as universal male
suffrage, and Bentham joined this orou
p as he explains below:
Everywhere have females possessed the
whole power of a
despot; everywhere but in France, with
out objection.
Talk of giving them as here the smal
lest fraction of
a fraction of such a pow, scorn with
out reason is all
the answer you receive."
Bentham said of the election of Prime
Minister by Parliament:
He is to be a functionary and he is
to be located (elected) by the
Legislature."12 He also mentioned the
appointment of civil servants
by competitive examination.
o
- Ibid., I I, 271.
l aIbid., IX, 103.
11 Ibid., IV, 567.
12Ib1d., IX, 208.
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Government, for Bentham as for Paine was a neces
sary evil.
"All Government is one vast evil and can only be
kept from mischief
by minute regulations and constant vigilance.
illogical must be radically wrong.“13

Whatever is plainly

Government, to the Utilitarian,

is evil, not because liberty is good but because pain
is evil; its
only justification is that its coercive action preve
nts more pain
than it creates.

Legislation for any other purpose than the "greatest

happiness of the greatest number” is evil;14 and since
many governments
sought simply to support existing institutions, this did
not even
justify their existence.
In the application of criminal law Bentham saw crime not
as
an offence against an absolute God but an obstruction
to the happiness
of the majority of the citizens of the State.

A crime is really an

act which causes so much more total pain than pleasure that
the state
must interfere, to redress the balance and punish crime.

The aims of

punishment is then first to create an actual pleasure, as
when we feel
that the criminal has what he deserves and second, to preve
nt the
recurrence of similar crimes.

The ultimate aim of punishment, there-

fore, is the reform of the criMinal, thus Bentham does
not favor
capital pnishment.

His standards of punishment are worked out with

an elaborate quaintness that makes them seem impractical, their gener
al
trend is that of modern criminal jurisprudence.15
"Bentham, A Fragment on Government, 137.
14Ibid., 93.
15
'Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and
Leoislation, 170.
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Bentham's more purely politi
cal program conforms in the end
pretty much to the program
of nineteenth-century Liberalis
m. He saw
the individual within a gen
tly paternal state; there he
was to lead
the good and useful life.
It is evident that Bentha
m's plans of reform, if not his
principles did suggest and
to some extent shape, the main
direction
of judicial and administrati
ve changes during the nineteent
h century,
though with SOME consequen
ces that he neither anticipated
nor desired.
It v's an impossible task
to effect reform without the aid
of
fellow radicals. Although
Bentham was considered an introv
ert and
seemed to find great pleasu
re in his periods of withdrawa
l he attracted
through his ,xitings numero
us followers. These fellow-tr
avelers were
able to implement in other
areas the principle of utilit
y advocatnd by
Bentham. Among his discip
les was Thomas Robert MAthus,
the friend
and executor of Rousseau.
He believed in human perfectibili
ty through
the proper adjustment of law
s and social institutions.16
He saw
happiness as the supreme
aspiration of man. But his son
, Robert
Malthus, took a gloomier vie
w of things and criticized his
father's
doctrines. His scholarly
work, an Essay on the Principle
of
Population (1798) brought
a stern realism to bear on contem
porary
optimism. He pictured blind
forces standing in the way of
human
betterment. Of these, the
growth of population was the pri
ncipal
obstacle for the increase
of population was a constant,17 whi
ch could
16

William Cobbelt, History of the
Recency and Rein of King,
Georlf
: the Fcurth (London, 1830),
128.
17
Ibid.
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be expressed mathematically as a geom
etrical progression.

In contrast

the increase in food resource was no
more than ar - nmetical.

Population

therefore automatically tended to outs
trip food supplies, and if this
was not obvious to men, it was beca
use of premature death, famine,
disease and war redressed the balance.
This was therefore the obstacle
in the way of Utopia and other perf
ect societies.18 A second edition
of Principles of Population in 1803 modi
fied the original argument to
the extent of admitting that civiliza
tion itself could diminish the
pressure of population in a humane
way, since a civilized morality
was itself a check on population. Malt
hus' theory became an important
part of Utilitarian doctrine, restrain
ing any tendency to Utopian
socialism and forming an inescapable
element in the intellectual
climate.
The most notable of the men close to
Bentham was James Mill.
He was the son of a Forforshire shoe
maker. He made his way to
Edinburgh University and distinguishe
d himself as a Greek scholar.19
He traveled to London in 1802 to live
by. journalism. There he
married, took a house in Pentonville
and his eldest son John was born
there in 1806.20 There he began to writ
e his monumental History of
india.21 He became a friend of Jeremy
Bentham soon after his arrival
in London and one of the staunchest
advocates of his philosophy. Mill
became the voice and conscience of Utilitar
ianism. His hope, like
18
Pau1, English Philosophers, 186.
19
Alexander Bains, James Mill (New York, 1967
), 18.
20John Stuart Mill, John Stuart Mill (New
York, 1944), 11.
21
James Mill, His_tory of British .India (Lon
don, 1840), 2.
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Bentham's was concentrated on
the rational revision of statutes
and institutions.
James Mill, in Elements of Politi
cal Economy (18211 put
forward a thesis close to tha
t of the Wealth of Nations with
the
addition of two propositions,
one that increases in land values
should be taxed 22
- and the other that means should
be found to
limit the population.23 To the
psychology of 7Pnthamism, a weak
point of Utilitarianism. Mill mad
e a great co-trbution with his
Analysis of the Phenomena of the
Human Mind (1329). Filled with
the passion exhibited by all emp
iricists to reduce human phenomena
to their simplest scientific ter
ms and axioms as a good utilitarian
to expose psychologies which mig
ht stand in the way of reform. Mil
l
derived all the phenomena of the
mind from "association." In what
is probably the most lucid wor
k on psychology ever written he
explains that "association" beg
ins with the association of the
sensations which empirijsts acc
ept as the indivisible and selfexplanatory facts of perceptio
n.
Ideas were the traces, the aft
er-effects of sensation;
association occured in trains (su
ccessive or in clusters
synchronoms) or in both modes.
it was by the merging of
cluster and trains of ideas
and sensations into nets of
associatons that our more com
plex ideas came into
existence. Thought succeeds tho
ught, idea follows idea,
incessantly. If our senses are
awake, we are continually
receiving sensations, of the
eye, the ear, the touch,
after sensations, ideas are per
petually excited of
sensations formerly received.
After those ideas, other
ideas and during the whole of
our lives, a series of those

61.

22 1
„ames Mill
23
Ibid., 101.

4

Elements of Political Econom,, (Lo
ndon, 1321),
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tow states of consciousness qlled sensations and
ideas is constantly going on.64
Thus mery is the 'calling up of trains of association through
some stimulus of feeling.

Belief is the calling up of associations

experienced as inseparable and so in every instance of belief, there
is indissoluble association of ideas."25
The birth, infancy, childhood, youth, adulthood of a human
being, are names for different parts of a certain series of
antecedents and cont-quents.

This is known by experience which

according to Mill, is sensation.

It followed for this psychology

that training and education were what we should describe today as
a behaviorist process of conditioning.

Sound education, including

moral education, was a matter of forming the right trains of
association so that "good" motives could counteract such bad ones
as might be called up in us, at least by recalling to us the
consequences of cur lesser actions.26
Mill's psychological Utilitarianism conceived man almost in
Newtonian terms, with the contents of his mind mechanically determined
by events beyond his control.27 It denied to the mind any innate
content and came close to Bertrand Russell's rejection of the self.
The man which emerged was depriveJd nf emotinnal, unconscious and
conative elements.

A psychology, so completely environmental lent

itself all too boldly as Eentham's quant tative measure of pleasure.
24James Mill, Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind
(London, 1829), 61.
25Ibid., 68.
26jp icio , 70-72.
27Ihid., 77.

This indicated at least one possible
path to Utopia.

If man was

the product of his environment then
it should be possible for those
who had the power of government to
alter the environment in order
to produce a different, a better, type
of man.
This was the thesis which Robert Owen
was urging indefatigly
upon everyone who would listen in thos
e years and was the main
support of his Utopian socialism. In
A New View of Society (1813)
this cotton manufacturer who spent more
th,,.r one trade fortune oo
the propagation of commission and whom
Leslo -tephen describe 'one of those bores who are the salt
of the t:orth, argued that
any general character, from the most
ignorant to the most enlightened,
may be given to any community even
to the world at large by thz!
application of proper means, which mean
s are to a great extent at
the command and under the control
of those who have influence in
the affairs of men.
He found no difficulty in reconcil
ing Utilitarianism with
socialism for these were one single
principle of action, "the
happiness of self, clearly understo
od and uniformly practiced which
can only be attained by conduct that
must promote the happiness
of the community.1,28
The purpose for the listings of the
fellow radicals of
Bentham is simply to indicate his
influence upon their philosophical
development. This group bore the name
"philosophical radicals."
These men formed a concentricity
in the basic principle
of utility. The chain continues in
a heritage of solidarity. The
28Robert
Owen, "A New View of Society," David
Carlton, (ed.),
Collected Essays (Boston, 1937), 16.
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men, friends and cohorts of Bentham supplemented the teachings of
their philosophical father.

No man had greater influence in the

extended success of Bentham than the son of one of these fellow
workers of Bentham, John Stuart Mill.

CHAPTER V
John Stuart Mill:

The inevitable Mutation

Sir Alfred C. Lyall said the greatest
contribution which
James Mill made to Utilitarianism was
his son, John Stuart Mill,
the dominant mind of Victorian England)
Mill, born in 1806, began studying Gree
k when he was three
and mathematics soon afterwards.

In his eighth year he began

learning Euclid, Algerbra and Latin,
read the Iliad and taught the
younger ones to read many of the same
works.
From my eighth year to my twelfth
year, the Latin books
which I remember reading were, Buca
lies of Virgil and
the first six books of the Aeneid; all
Horace except the
Epodes, the fables of Phaedrus, the firs
t five books of
Livy. . . . All Sallust, a consider
able part of Ovid's
Metamorphasis, some plays of Terence, two
or three books
of Lucretius, several of the orations
of Cicero and his
writings on oratory, also letters to Atti
cus. . . . In
Greek I read the Iliad and Odyssey thro
ugh, one or two
plays of Sophocles, Euripides and Aris
tophanes, though
by these I profited little . . .
and lastly Aristotle's
Rhetoric.2
At the price of acquiring no physical
dexterities and few
friends, he began his intellectual life
a quarter of a century in
advance of his contemporaries, having
in his infancy mastered the
authorities usually introduced to stud
ents only at the university.
Me met and talked precociously with his
father's companions, Jeremy
Bentham and Samuel Bentham (with whom
he spent a year in France),
lLyall, Studies in Literature, 209.
2John Stuart Mill, Mill, 30.
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David Ricardo and many others, who
were appropriate mentors for the
intellectual stoicism imposed by his
father and was a part of the
theory of the proper formation of char
acter on Benthamite principles.3
John was a product of the new order,
but admitted to being a
disputatious, conceited, impertinent
young fellow. Yet in
adolescence he, who had been so care
fully screened from any Christian
education, experienced a conversion
to Benthamism:
My previous education had been,
in a certain sense, already
a course of Benthamism. The Benthami
c standard of 'the
greatest happiness' was that which
I had always been taught
to apply: I was even familiar with an
abstract discussion
of it forming an episode in an unpu
blished dialogue on
Government written by my father on
the Platonic model.
Yet in the first pages of Bentham
it burst upon me with
all the force of novelty. What thus
impressed me was the
chapter in which Bentham passed judg
ement on the common
modes of reasoning in morals and legi
slation, deduced from
phrases like 'law oC nature,' righ
t reason,' the moral
sense,' 'natural restitudes' and the
like
them as dogmaticism in disguise imposing , and characterized
its sentiments
upon others under cover of sounding
expressions which
convey no reason for the sentiment,
but set up sentiment
as its own reason. It had not stru
ck me before, that
Bentham's principle put an end to
all this. The feeling
rushed upon me, that all previous
moralts were superseded and that here indeed was the
commencement of a new
era in thonght.4
At the end of his reading of Bent
ham he found himself in
the possession of a "creed, a doctrine
, a philr,,
and among the
best senses of the word, a religion
; the inculcation and diffusion
which could be made the principal outw
ard purpose of a life."5 This
was the faith to which he devoted
himself. He disccered thi.' word
'utilitarian' first in Gaits' Anna
ls of the Parish in the passage
3
Ibid., 671.
4
Ibid., 54.
s Ibid.
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where the Scottish pastor around whom the book is written warns his
parishioners not to abandon the Gospel and become utilitarians.

Mill

seized on the word with "a boy's fondness for a name and a banner
.

And for some years called myself and others by it as a
sectarian appellation."6 Later Bentham further enlightened the
youth in the use of the word.

He pursued the cause with youthful

fanaticism and at the age of sixteen he conceived the plan of a
small society of young men likeminded with himself. This group
organized for the discussion of ethics and politics on Benthamite
principles was called the "Utilitarian Society" and wes duly
formed and continued for at least three years to meet quite often
at the home of Jeremy Bentham.
Mill must rank, not simply as the exponent, but as the
humanizer of Utilitarianism.7 Throughout his life and writings
we find that he is torn between the Benthamite's principles on
which he believed his faith was firmly founded and his consciousness
of deep and lasting humanlvalues which he felt it to be the business
of Benthamism to support, not to destroy. This conflict makes his
work of the most extraordinary interest.

More clearly in Mill than

in any other empirical philosopher emerges the conflict between
the scientific philosophy he was busy expounding and the human values
he felt compelled to expouse.

Conflict, for him, began with an

acute personal crisis which immediately modified his Utilitarianism
6
Ibid., 103.
7
Brinton, English Political Thought, 90.

7'
and began that overth
row of his father's aut
hority which Mrs. Taylor
helped him to complete.8
From the day when, as
a fifteen year old boy, he
had been
converted to a religi
ous Benthamism, he had dec
ided that his task
was the reform of the
world. He had even congra
tulated himself on
the certainty of the
happy life that this wou
ld bring. But five
years later he would
ask:
Suppose that all your
obj
that all the changes and ects in life were realized:
institutions and opinions
you are looking forwar
which
d to, could be completel
at this instant; would
y effected
this be a great joy and
to you? And an irrepr
hap
essible self-consciousness piness
distinctly
answered, no! At thi
s
foundation on which my my heart sank within me: the whole
life was constructed fel
my happiness was to
have been found in the con l down. All
tinual pursuit
of this end. The end
has ceased, to charm and how
these ever again be any
could
interest in the means?
to have nothing left
I
see
med
to live for.9
He blamed his collap
se on the severity and ari
dity of his
early education at the
hands of his father: thi
s had sharpened his
powers of analysis onl
y in the end to erode his
capacity for feeling
and to leave him torpid
and joyless. He feared
he would never feel
again and without feelin
g he was in possession
of a well-equipped ship
8Joh
n Stuart Mill met Har
riet Taylor in 1830. Mrs
the wife of John Taylor
. Taylor was
. For sometime there was
maintaining the outwar
a
fee
ble
at
tempt at
d
of the Taylors. In Mil appearance of a normal family life on the part
l's Autobiogra_phy he des
cribes her beauty, charm
and wit in most eloque
nt terms. She had a gre
repeatedly comments
at influence on Mill. He
on
in fact, little doubt his intellectual indebtedness to her. There
is,
that everything Mill publis
reflected, to some de
hed
aft
er
18
43
gree, her attitudes and op
inio
Dissertations and Dis
cussions pointedly acknowled ns. The Preface to
contribution, the Pr
ges her substantial
in
production and she is ciges of Econera is presented as a joint
even given a measure of cr
edit for A System of
Logjc. They finally
married August 21, 1851
, and maintained a warm
domestic relationship
throughout life.
9John Stuart Mill, Mi
ll, 113.
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and rudder but no sail.

Poetry, above all Wordsworth's poetry, helped

Mill to recover from despair which threatened his reason and made him
ask whether he was bound to go on living:
What made Wordswcrth's poems a medicine for my state of
mind, was that they expressed, not mere outward beauty,
but states of feeling, and of thought colored by feeling,
under the excitement of beauty. They seemed to be the
very culture of the feelings which I was in quest of.
In them I seemed to draw from a source of inward joy, of
sympathetic and imaginative pleasure, which could be
shared in by all human beings: which had not connection
with struggle or imperfection but would be made richer
by every improvement in the physical or social condition
of mankind. 10
Mill did not abandon the theory that happiness is the test
of all rules of conduct and the end of life; at least not in so many
words, but he began to ally emphasis on inner cultural processes and
to owe much to Coleridge and his school whose philosophy was anatne
ma
to Utilitarians.

He so modified the general theory of Bentham as to

conclude that the direct pursuit of happiness is a mirage.

"Thou

only are happy who have their minds fixed on some object other than
their happiness. u ll Sc deeply did this lessen penetrate his ideology
that in the conclusion of his Logic he wrote:
I fully admit this is true
; that the cultivation of an
ideal nobleness of will and conduct, should be to
individual human beings an end, to which the specific
pursuit either of their own happiness or that of others
should, in any case of conflict, give way.12

10Ibid., 125.
11
Ib1d., 126.
12Marshall
Cohen (ed.), The Philosophy of John Stuart Mill:
Ethical, Political and Reliagious TNew York, 1961), 195.
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That seems a plain enough appeal to motives beyond hedonism.

Yet he

goes on in a circular argument to justify the abandonment of the
search for happiness on hedonistic principles.
ilevation or character itself is to be decided by
reference to happiness as a standard; this can only
mean that the abandonment of the pursuit of happiness
In favor of nobleness of conduct can only be qqtermined in the degree that it yields happiness."
Character itself should h, to the individual, a paramount end,
simply because the existence of this ideal of nobleness of character
or a near approach to it, in any abundance, would go further than
all these things tm.iards maki% human life happy.14
There are many more passages which suggest that John Stuart
Mill had relegated happiness to the role of a by-product.

It is

possible that the nobleness of Mill's own character would not per-it
him without protest to remain subject to naked doctrines of
expediency and self-interest.
In the essay "Utilitarianism" originally published in
Fraser's Masazine in 1861, Mill asserte that he adheres to the
Greatest Happiness Theory, however and sets out to expound and
develop it.

Plausibly he argues for the social character of

Benthamism as against its individualism.
The standard is not the agent's own standard, not his
own happiness, but the happiness altogether; and if it
may possibly be doubted whether a noble character Is
always happier for its nobleness, there can be no doubt
that it rakes other people happipr, and that in general
is imensely the gainer for it..
13Ibid., 160.
System of Logic, II, 530.
15 Ibid., 536.

f3;
What if a person sh
ould accept their mi
sery so long as it ma
kes
others happier, what
becomes of the plea
sure-pain principle of
conduct? Benthamism
is greatly confused
by this social orient
ation
which Mill gives
it, for there is a fa
r-reaching differen
ce between
personal pursuit of
happiness in the se
rene confidence that
this
leads to general ha
ppiness and the su
bjection of personal
conduct
and then to a social
judgment upon it.
The simple canon has
suddenly
gone. One reaches
the conclusion that
pleasure and pain ar
e not
reliable guides to
general happiness.
It would seem that
the social
good or general ha
ppiness may sometime
s be better reached
by what
gives us individual
ly pain than by what
individually gives
us
pleasure. Mill was
superior in breadth
of vision of Jeremy Be
ntham
and so perhaps this
constant appeal to
goods or values beyond
ut:lity
or expediency is no
t surprising.
The basic criteria
for Mill is justic
e. It is idle to adva
nce
theories of utility
if thereby, in the
common connotation of
the word,
justice will not be
established. He de
als with the problem
in the
chapter "On the Conn
ection between Just
ice and Utility' in
Utilitarianism. Th
e greatest-happine
ss of the greatest nu
mber is on
the surface an appe
al to justice. Mill
asserts;
Alone justice is th
rules, which conc e name for certain classes of moral
er
more nearly and ar n the essentials of human well-being
e therefore of more
absolute obligation
than any other ru
,
les for the guidance
that an absolute or
of life: It follow
s
ne
ar-absolute just
There are two esse
ntial ingredients in ice must be found.
desire to punish
justice: (1) the
or
harm, (2) the know take revenge on a person who has done
le
to some definite in dge or feeling that harm has been done
dividual or individu
als.16
16
Cohen, The Philos
ophy of John Stuart
Mill, 471.

That philosophy is not to be judged in isolation, in terms
of whether
or not it is true in itself, but in its social consequence.
Now the difference between these schools of philosophy,
that of Intuitieo and that of Experience and Association,
is not a mere matter of abstract speculation; it is full
of praclical consequences and lies at the foundation of
all the naeatest differences of practical opinion in an
age of rogress. The practical reformer has continually
to demand that changes be made in things which are supported by powerful and widely-spread feelings or to
question the apparent necessity and indefeasibleness of
established facte; aed it is often an indespensable part
of argement to show, how those powerful feelings had their
origin and how those facts came to seem necessary and
indivisible. There is therefore a natural hostility
between him and a philosophy ,7hich discourages the
explanation of feelings and moral facts by circumstances
and association, an6 prefers to treat them as ultimate
elements of human nature: a philosophy which is
addicted to holding up favorite doctrines, as intuitive
truths, and deems intuitive truths, deems intuition to
be the voice of Nature and God, speaking with an
authority higher than that of our reason. In particular,
I have long felt that the prevailing tendency to regard
all the marked distinctions of human character as innat
e
and in the main indelible and to ignore the irresistib
le
proofs that by far the greater part of those difference
s,
whether between individuals, row or sexes are such as not
only might but naturally would be produced by differences
in circumstances, is bne of the chief hindrances to the
rational treatment of social questions and one ot the
greatest stumbling blocks of human improvement."
Mill in Utilitarianism presents an optimistic doctrine
of
progress.
Yet no one whose opinion deserves a moment's ccnsiderat
ion
can doubt that most of the great positive evils of this
world are in themselves removable and will if human affai
rs
continue to improve, be in the end reduced within narrow
limits. Poverty, in any sense implying suffering, can be
completely extinguished by the wisdom of society, combined
with the good sense and providence of individuals. Even
that most intractable of enemies, disease, can infinitely
be reduced in dimensions by good physical and moral
education and proper control of noxious influences; which
17Ibid.

231-233.

the progress of science holds out
a promise for the
future of still more conquests
over this detestable
foe. . . . All the ground sou
rces, in short, of human
suffering are in a great degree,
many of them almost
entirely, conquerable by humen
care and effort.18
Thus was developed in England,
twenty years after Bentham's
death, a new and simplified for
m of the Utilitarian philosophy.
The
Utilitarians did not now includ
e in their doctrine the principle of
the artificial indentificaticn of
interests. It was under the
influence of John Stuart Mill tha
t the objections of Liberalism
against the Authoritarian Democr
acy and the objections of Socialism
against the philosophy of laisse
faire Capitalism arose. The simple
dogma of the "greatest happiness
" was now replaced by a new concep
t
of progress which involved the
social good rather than the indivi
dual.
Just as Bentham had borrowed and
changed the ideas of other men by
new application the inevitable
change had been made in Benthamis
m by
its most devoted adherent.19
18
Ibid., 233.
19
It is worth while to list one exa
mple where J. S. Mill
softened the meaning of even Ben
tham's sentences. Betitham, Works,
I,
161. "There are truths which it
is necessary to prove; not or the
ir
own sakes, because they are ack
nowledged, but that an opening may
made for the reception of other
be
truths which depend upon them. It
necessary to demonstrate certain
is
palpable truths, in order that oth
ers,
which may depend upon them, may
be adopted. It is in this manner
we
provide for the reception of
first
prepare the way for the admission principles, which, once received,
of all other truths. All the wor
ld
acknowledges that assassination
is an evil action; its punishment
ought
to be severe: everybody is agr
eed again. If it is necessary to
analyze
the mischievous effects of assass
ination, it will be necessary as a
towards bringing men to acknowled
step
ge the fitness of the law which
distinguishes between different
species of assassination, that it may
only punish them according to the
ir respective degrees of malignity
that those actions which bear
the exterior characters of assassina
tion
but do not produce its better
fruits, any either not be punished or
only
punished in a less degree: for
example, suicide, dwelling, infantici
murder after violent provocati
on." Compare John S. Mill's quotes and de,

interpretation in nis essay on Bentham, Westminster Review,
AprilAugust, 1838, 424. "There are truths which it is necessary
to prove,
not for their own sakes, because they are acknowledged but
,
that on
opening may be made for the reception of other truths which depend
upon them. It is in this manner we provide for the reception of
first principles, which, once received, prepared the way for admiss
ion
of all other truths." To which may be added, that in this manner
also
do we discipline the mind for practicing the same sort of dissertion
upon questions more complicated and of more doubtful issue.

CHAPTER VI
Conclusion
The Utilitarian's approach to politics
, economics, morals,
ethics and psychology was a part of the
tradition of ideological
thinking which had flourished since the
late eighteenth century.
Of course, some of their doctrinarism
was temperamental but it
also had an intellectual component whic
h was derived from that
tradition. The Utilitarians had a meas
ure of that abstraction
in their theorizing that led them to
base their actions on a
level of reality which most of the othe
r political observers did
not recognize. They had a rationalisti
c skepticism about religion
and a suspicion of tradition that attr
acted the enmity of antiidealogical critics. Their ideas were
invested with populist
assumptions similar to those found among the
revolutionary
intelligentsia of the late eighteenth cent
ury.
The significance of the Syncretistic Util
itarian dogma
was not so much the fact that it was more
radical than any scheme
of reform that was practicable in this
era, but the fact that it
had omitted the stage of liberal thought
that regarded constitutional
limitations as the chief guarantees of free
dom. John Stuart Mill
said of the Utilitarians that they were
liberals not so much because
they believed in liberty but because they
believed in good government.
It was accepted among the Utilitarians that
all men are driven by a
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restless desire for power which institutional limit
ations cannot check.
The power itself must be implimented for public good
through education
and positive psychological methods.
The Utilitarian philosophers were an intellectu
al force of
enormous practical importance in the nineteenth
century.

Withuut

attaining the proportions of a party they disse
minated ideas in the
light of which a vast amount of antiquated
political doctrines were
swept away and legislation, administration and
judicial processes we -c,
made both more efficient and more democratic
. The reform of Par olent,
the repeal of obsolete restrictions on trade
and industry and the
reorganization of the judicial system were the
most conspicious
examples of this mutation.

Parliamentary reform initiated within a

few years a long series of administrative refor
ms in which men tained
in the ideas of Bentham played an important thoug
h not always a
conspicious part.
No one in the development of this radical philosophy
left
a more profound imprint than Jeremy Bentham.

Historians have

attempted to explain the causation involved in
the greatness of
this man.

Two factors are obious.

The first involves that

vague but essential statement--the times were
ripe.

Before the

extreme departure of the French Revolution
, the philosophers were
able to proceed under the banner of so-called
natural rights, a
long and satisfying tradition going back even
to the Romans. Thus
there was at this time no need to appeal
to Utility. The events
of 1789, however, showed that natural rights
might be a "blank
check" in the future, waiting for the masse
s to write in the

E6
overturn of any and all political
order.

A defense of reform was

needed and Bentham's utility doct
rine was available.
In this atmosphere of rapid change
it was evident that a
new principle more closely related
to a scientific approach had to
be found. The rapid technologica
l innovations created a void for
social and moral reformation. The
nostalgic panaceas had failed
but the dogma of utility offered
a new optimism. :t is true that
the negative nature of the natural
rights doctrine and its results
in the French Revolution had caus
ed a new estimation to be advocated
by the philosophical world.
The second area of explanation
involves the application
made by Bentham of the utility
principle. Where other thinkers
tended to apply utility only to
the individual he took the axiom
of the greatest happiness of the
greatest number as the measure of
social morality. It would be fai
r to say that out of the ancient
philosophical doctrine of hedoni
sm, a political philosophy of
Utilitarianism was created.
Bentham, with great discriminati
on, used his sources well
and often without giving credit
or citations. He was able to apply
the principle of utility, found
in other philosophers, methodically
and relentlessly to the penal and
constitutional laws of his time.
His doctrine meticulously and
fully worked out, was drawn from
the
isolation of the philosophical
ivory tower and applied by him in
numerous ways through methods
logically devised for the complex
world where reform was necessary
. He worked out the minutiae
of practice to meet the needs of the Engl
ish Middle Class, which

had been created by the Industrial Revolution.

They were the ones

seeking a new ideology and to them Bentham at last made his appeal
.
The major content of this study has related the ability of
Bentham to organize and codify.

His greatest contribution was in

his originality of arrangement.

His themes were found in many

of the writings of earlier and contemporary philosophers.
found tIF, moral arithmetic in Beccaria, Hobbes and Gay.

He

His

combination of their elements resulted in an application of a
principle not used in this manner primarily.

The formula of the

greatest happiness of the greatest number was not original with
Bentham; he took these from Priestley, Hutchenson and Beccaria.
It was due then to Bentham's unique application that he gained
fame from his philosophical endeavors.

A great deal of what

Bentham said was also being said by other nineteenth-century
radicals.

But from Benthall came

Utilitarianism.

synthetic fabric of

He acted as a weaver working a loom religiously

and rapidly to weave the resultant radicalism.
Bentham was aware of his indebtedness to his sources.

He

says that the principle of utility was in some respects used by
many different philosophers.

Bentham was an English empiricist

following the lineage of Francis Bacon.

As listed in Chapter

Three he borrowed his greatest happiness principle from the pen
of Proteus Priestly.

No book read by Bentham influenced him more

profoundly than Cel',Espirt by Helvetius.

Here the utility principle

was applied in a new perspective, that of law.

The great work by

Beccaria, pei Delitti e delle Pene, employed the utility principle

88

to change the methodology of penology.

In fact in Beccaria the

principle of utility wes applied to every area of life. The
felicific
calculus created by Beccaria was used by Bentham as a measu
re of
morals as well as government and legislation.
In the future, new light will be shed in this area of
Benthamite scholarship as new MSS are made available.
of editing alone by John Bowring will be exposed.

The amount

The work of

Bowring has been a source of confusion in the study
of Bentham due
to his omission of valuable comments made by the philo
sopher.

At

present the scholar is aware of the need for further
work in this
field.
In the patient drudgery of Bentham the faith in reason
which he inherited from the Enlightenment was combined
with an
ideal of professional competence which produced reform.

It was

this reformation that made government both more liberal
and more
efficient.
The influence exerted by Bentham was sustained through
his followers into many areas.

James Mill applied the Utilitarian

principles in his study of psychology, Robert Owens maint
ained that
the utilitarian formula would provide a perfect environmen
t and
from this would come perfect humanity.
greatest change occured.

In John Stuart Mill the

The sirple dogma was replaced by the

concept of progress which involved the social rather
than the
individual good.
Bentham had exclaimed early in his career, "I advance
but they do not follow."

Had he received his greatest wish,
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to live out his life a day at the time, one day in each decade,
he would have fet great satisfaction.

The "greatest good for

the greatest number" had become the greatest force.
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